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As the implementation of collaborative governance processes in response to natural resource 
issues continues to grow, gaining a better understanding of what makes some processes more 
successful than others is crucial to promoting effective future resource governance.  Following 
one of the worst droughts in state history, Colorado implemented its own collaborative water 
planning and governance process in the form of Basin Roundtables.  Each Roundtable, 
composed of diverse stakeholders as defined by the enacting legislation, works together to assess 
its home basin’s current and future water needs and to propose solutions that ideally satisfy a 
wide variety of water users while simultaneously resulting in more sustainable future water use.  
Using data from twenty-eight comprehensive interviews with Roundtable participants, as well as 
direct observations of Roundtable meetings across the state, this study analyzes the Roundtable 
process as a case study of collaborative governance, paying specific attention to how 
stakeholders interact with one another to form coalitions and produce outcomes.  While 
Roundtable members do not appear to alter their core values or form strict coalitions as a result 
of interacting with others in this process, they do learn about one another’s values and work 
cooperatively to reach consensus on a diversity of formal and informal outcomes.  However, 
these outcomes are limited by a variety of biophysical, social, and political factors that may 
restrict the Roundtable process from creating major changes to Colorado’s water governance 
regime.  Moreover, while the norm of consensus may serve as a motivator for Roundtable 
members to strive for solutions that truly benefit all groups, it may also limit the scope of 
available solutions to those that do not vary greatly from the status quo.  This thesis closes with a 
number of hypotheses that emerge from this exploratory research that can be tested more 
formally in future studies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Over the past twenty-five years, the use of collaborative strategies in natural resource 
governance—and especially the governance of watersheds—has become increasingly common 
(Kenney et al., 2000).  Collaborative processes often strive to bring together diverse stakeholders 
to design and carry out plans, policies, and projects that help to manage a resource in a way that 
is mutually acceptable to all involved.  However, because stakeholders may hold opposing or 
even completely contradictory values about the resource and how it should be governed, these 
processes can be painstakingly slow, difficult, and unfulfilling for some participants.  
Consequently, understanding how collaborative governance processes actually function on-the-
ground and what makes some processes more successful than others at achieving their stated 
goals is crucial to the promotion of effective future processes.  Thus, this research broadly 
explores the conditions under which collaborative governance processes can produce successful 
policy outcomes by specifically examining the following research objectives (ROs): if and how 
stakeholder values are effectively reconciled in a collaborative process (RO1) and how outcomes 
are produced in collaborative policy processes (RO2). 
These research objectives are investigated through a case study of Colorado’s Interbasin 
Compact Committee (IBCC) and Basin Roundtable (Roundtable) process.  Following a severe 
drought in 2002 that devastated much of Colorado, the state agency primarily in charge of 
governing the state’s water resources—the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB)—
began the “most comprehensive analysis of Colorado water ever undertaken” (State of Colorado, 
2014).  As part of this analysis, a collaborative process was initiated in order to better understand 
water issues from the perspectives of a wide variety of water users on a local scale.  Specifically, 
the 2005 Colorado Water for the 21st Century Act established the Interbasin Compact Committee 
  
(IBCC), a group that aims to facilitate discussion among Colorado’s river basins to
variety of statewide water issues and future supply gaps (
“Basin Roundtables,” or groups of
basins (plus the Denver Metro area) were created to bring local v
Figure 1 for basin divisions).  Each Roundtable is mandated to work collaboratively to assess its 
basin’s water needs and devise recommendations for future water managemen
uncertainties in climate and populati
Figure 1: Colorado’s Basin Roundtables as shown in the SWSI 2010 Report (CWCB, 2011a)
After eight years of work on their individual basin assessments and various projects 
within their basins, the Roundtables have recently been tasked with providing insight and data on 
“statewide and basin-specific water values” that will inform Colorado’s 
statewide water plan (CO Exec Order, 2013
only have to collaborate with other stakeholders in their basin as they have been doing for 
2
CWCB, 2014d).  Simultaneously,
 diverse stakeholders from each of the state’s hydrologic 
oices to the conversation 
t in the face of 
on growth.  
Water Plan, the first 
).  During this process, Roundtable members wil
 address a 
 
(see 
 
 
ever 
l not 
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approximately eight years, but they will have to collaborate across basins in order to create a 
functional statewide water plan, adding a new level of complexity to the process in the years to 
come. 
This project employs an in depth case study approach in which the IBCC/Roundtable 
process serves as the broader case and each Roundtable serves as an individual unit of analysis in 
order to capture both the individuality of the basins as well as their common set of rules and 
procedures.  Along with extensive observations of IBCC and Roundtable meetings across the 
state, twenty-eight in-depth, responsive interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) were conducted with 
Roundtable participants in order to better understand the mechanisms underlying the process as a 
whole as well as the inner-workings of each Roundtable individually.  These interviews were 
coded qualitatively, which allowed for an in-depth examination of themes and patterns within 
and across Roundtables (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, is 
applied here in order to analyze how stakeholders participating in this collaborative governance 
process reconcile their values and produce outcomes within the limits of the larger subsystem of 
water governance in Colorado.  Fundamental concepts to the ACF, such as coalition strategy, 
belief change and learning, hierarchical belief structures, and policy outputs (Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007), guided this research.  Specific areas of the framework—namely Long-Term 
Coalition Opportunity Structures—were also examined for their relevance to collaborative 
processes.  This approach allows not only for an in-depth investigation of some of the most 
important ACF variables in a new and understudied collaborative process in Colorado, but it also 
provides insight into the largely unexplored area of how collaborative processes and the 
negotiated policy agreements they attempt to produce fit into the ACF (Weible et al., 2011). 
  4
Arrangement of the Thesis 
Following this introductory chapter is a chapter reviewing the existing literature on 
collaborative governance processes, with special attention paid to how success is defined in a 
collaborative process as well as the importance of incorporating a diversity of relevant interests 
into these processes.  Additionally, the major theoretical framework used in this paper is 
introduced, and specific variables of analysis are defined.  Chapter 3 then introduces the case 
study, first by providing a detailed explanation of the complexities of water law and governance 
in the state of Colorado that surround this case, and then by delving into the IBCC/Roundtable 
process as a whole as well as the issues facing each individual basin.  Chapter 4 ties this case to 
the ACF literature and proposes how collaborative processes might best fit into the overall 
framework.  After this, Chapter 5 details the research design and methods employed in this 
study.  Chapters 6 and 7 present the results and discussion of the two major proposed research 
objectives.  Finally, Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the challenges and successes uncovered 
in this case and how these can provide insight into the creation of effective collaborative 
governance processes.  After recognizing the limitations of this research, the closing chapter also 
defines a number of hypotheses generated from this exploratory study that can be systematically 
tested in further research on the Roundtable process and similar collaborative governance 
processes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Assessing Collaborative Governance using the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Collaborative Governance Literature 
Numerous experiments in the collaborative governance of natural resources have 
emerged rapidly since the 1990s (Kenney et al., 2000).  While these processes may be referred to 
as collaborative, participatory, and interactive among many other terms, all of their definitions 
typically contain the following factors: inclusion of various stakeholders and/or the public, 
repeated face-to-face discussions among participants, and a mission to build consensus, often 
within a new, locally-scaled forum.  In other words, collaborative governance processes bring 
together a wide variety of stakeholders to govern—or create and enforce rules about (Andersson 
et al., 2009)—a resource in a way that is mutually acceptable to all participants involved.  Since 
their emergence, many scholars have hailed collaborative governance processes as the panacea 
for solving major conflicts associated with traditional, top-down resource governance (e.g. 
Johnson et al., 2005).  As a result, a plethora of research has focused on critically evaluating 
these processes in order to determine if, when, and how they can truly be successful (Leach & 
Pelkey, 2001; Conley & Moote, 2002; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Raadgever et al., 2012). 
As alluded to above, many collaborative governance processes have emerged in response 
to failures associated with traditional modes of governance, such as high cost, politicization, and 
unsuccessful or incomplete implementation (Ansell & Gash, 2007).  However, many criticisms 
of collaborative governance focus on similar failures.  In this vein, Blomquist and Schlager 
(2005) find that collaborative processes (specifically those concerning watersheds, one of the 
most popular settings in which collaborative governance has been used) can be ineffective 
because of the difficulties inherent in defining resource boundaries, assembling appropriate 
decision-making bodies, and facilitating accountability among members that share governance 
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responsibilities.  Margerum (2007) identifies similar factors that constrain effective collaboration 
in many locally-based forums in the US and Australia: transaction costs, limited perspective, 
organizational sustainability, policy issues (i.e. conflicts across multiple jurisdictions), and the 
adequacy of representation.  Ananda and Proctor (2013) argue that “[c]urrent institutional 
configuration and rules, particularly, the norms of agency authority and administrative 
inflexibility act as the most critical obstacles to collaboration” (p. 105).  However, what an 
“effective” collaborative governance process looks like to these scholars is often somewhat 
unclear, which makes a critical assessment of the success of any given process quite difficult; 
yet, relevant evaluations of how these time- and resource-intensive processes work—and what 
outcomes actually arise from them—are extremely important to participants, facilitators, 
policymakers, funders, advocates, and academics alike (Conley & Moote, 2003). 
Defining “Success” in Collaborative Governance Processes 
 
Many collaborative governance processes are based on specific goals to improve the 
quality of the resource being governed.  Consequently, collaborative groups should be able to 
measure “success” by determining whether the quality of a resource has improved in the way 
they set out to improve it.  However, Leach and Sabatier (2005), speaking specifically about 
collaborative watershed governance processes, explain that it is often difficult to collect reliable, 
long-term data that clearly demonstrate a group’s causal effect on watershed health, especially 
when management goals are vague or the process is poorly funded.  Thus, scholars often utilize 
“organizational” outcomes as measures of success when evaluating collaborative governance 
processes.  These measures include evaluations of participants’ satisfaction with the 
collaborative process or their perceived impact on the watershed, among other variables.  When 
collaborative watershed governance processes also attempt to deal with issues other than water 
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quality such as resource allocation, biophysical outcomes as a representation of successful 
governance may be even more difficult to measure.  Kenney (2000) suggests a definition of 
success somewhere in the middle of these extremes that focuses on “determining if [the] role 
[played by watershed groups] helps to create or contribute to processes leading to on-the-ground 
problem solving” (p. 10, emphasis mine). 
Recognizing the complexity inherent in choosing one measure of success for 
collaborative governance processes, especially when combined with the difficulty of obtaining 
long-term, reliable data on the changing physical characteristics of the watershed, Leach et al. 
(2002) outline “a manageable set of six disjointed criteria that together can be used to adequately 
measure partnership success”: 1) perceived effects of the partnership on specific problems in the 
watershed; 2) perceived effects of the partnership on human and social capital; 3) the extent of 
agreement reached among the stakeholders; 4) implementation of restoration projects; 5) 
monitoring projects; and 6) education and outreach projects (p. 652).  They then test these six 
broad criteria on a sample of forty-four watershed partnerships in California in order to ensure 
that none of the variables are highly correlated and could thus be discarded, which they are not.  
These criteria provide an example of assessing both organizational outcomes and physical 
outcomes on the watershed to determine the success of the process, as suggested by Kenney 
(2000). 
One of Leach et al.’s (2002) criteria—the extent of agreement reached among the 
stakeholders—is often cited as a particularly important measure of success in collaborative 
governance processes.  Specifically, because “the goal of collaboration is typically to achieve 
some degree of consensus” (Ansell & Gash, 2007), the achievement of “consensus” among 
stakeholders is often equated with success.  In their 2007 update to the Advocacy Coalition 
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Framework, Sabatier and Weible also attempt to recognize the central role of consensus in some 
governance processes by specifying a variable called “degree of consensus needed for major 
policy change” (p. 200); however, their specific purpose here is to allow for the ACF to be 
applied in non-Western governments that may be more consensus-oriented than the US.  
Importantly, because consensus is poorly defined in many cases, and can even lead to the 
suppression of conflicting views (Kenney, 2000), other measures of success must be examined 
along with consensus (Leach et al., 2002) when evaluating the success of a collaborative 
governance process. 
Specific Variables to Consider in Assessments of Collaborative “Success” 
Leach et al. (2002) specifically cite the need to “identify the structural, procedural, and 
contextual factors that allow some partnerships to achieve greater success than others” (p. 666).  
While there surely is a need to continue the identification of these factors in different and novel 
contexts, a number of scholars have outlined various criteria by which they either measure 
“success” or feel contribute to the success of a collaborative process (see Sabatier et al., 2005b, 
for a review of four major frameworks that have been used previously to help explain the success 
of various institutional arrangements).  The following review of literature on measures specific to 
analyzing success in collaborative processes attempts to add to this dialogue.  Although it is not 
nearly comprehensive, an overwhelming number of variables arise that appear to be important 
for creating—or at least evaluating—success in a collaborative governance process.  However, 
certain patterns arise that emphasize some of the most important, or at least the most often 
recognized, of these variables.  Table 1 outlines some of the most often cited criteria for success 
in collaborative governance processes and is followed by a discussion of most of the major 
studies contributing to the criteria.  Taken together, these criteria not only provide a number of 
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Table 1.  Factors Perceived as Important for Success in Collaborative Processes 
Factor          Explanation/Reasoning for Factor’s Importance Studies Specifically Citing Factor 
Funding/Resources • Secure funding helps promote long-term project sustainability 
• Adequate funding eases the managerial process of allocating 
limited resources 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Bidwell & 
Ryan (2006); Sabatier & Weible 
(2007) 
Leadership • Effective, neutral leadership provides facilitation, mediation, 
& empowerment for the process 
• Bottom-up leadership is important for credibility & 
incorporating multiple knowledges into the process 
• A balance of leadership among institutional levels (i.e. local, 
state, and federal) is often required 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Sabatier & 
Weible (2007); Ansell & Gash (2008) 
Trust • Building relationships that foster interpersonal trust helps to 
devise mutually acceptable/beneficial solutions 
• Trust often doesn’t occur naturally, but building it can be 
facilitated in many ways such as open information sharing and 
face-to-face dialogue 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Sabatier & 
Weible (2007); Ansell & Gash (2008) 
Commitment • Participants must be committed to the collaborative process 
rather than to their own individual interests 
• Commitment can be built through a sense of shared ownership 
in the process and a recognition of interdependence 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Sabatier & 
Weible (2007); Ansell & Gash (2008) 
Goals/Institutional 
Design 
• Successful partnerships focus on a number of attainable, 
clearly defined goals 
• Achieving goals creates an incentive to participate, especially 
when this achievement is dependent on many members 
• Understanding how the process is nested within current 
institutional structures is essential for realizing goals 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Ansell & 
Gash (2008); Ananda & Proctor 
(2013) 
Diverse Composition 
and Participation 
• Through the process of dealing with their own internal 
differences, diverse groups create collective goals that serve a 
broader number of interests 
• Diverse participation requires active recruiting of relevant 
interests—it does not happen naturally or by having 
membership simply be “open” to anyone 
Leach & Pelkey (2001); Bidwell & 
Ryan (2006); Sabatier & Weible 
(2007) 
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useful variables to consider when examining a collaborative governance process, but they also 
reinforce the complexity of defining “success.” 
Leach and Pelkey (2001) review thirty-seven available studies on collaborative watershed 
partnerships, all of which define “success” in one of two broad ways: through “the adoption 
and/or implementation of watershed plans, projects, or policies, and their eventual impacts on 
environmental or socioeconomic indicators” (physical outcomes) or through measures of “trust 
building, conflict resolution, satisfying the stakeholders, and strengthening the long-term 
organizational capacity of the partnership” (organizational outcomes; p. 380).  However, the 
authors identify 210 distinct “lessons learned” from these studies, which they then sort into 28 
major themes, of which the most often identified are “adequate funding (62% of studies), 
effective leadership and management (59%), interpersonal trust (43%), and committed 
participants (43%)” (p. 378).  Using a factor analysis, the authors identify four factors that 
explain 95% of the variance in the 28 themes: 1) balancing the partnership’s resources with its 
scope of activities; 2) employing a flexible and informal partnership structure, 3) variables from 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) framework (such as broad-based membership and 
consensus decision-making), and 4) variables from the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework (such as monitoring and well-defined process rules).  Other studies have since 
delved more closely into examining one of two sets of these variables (see Ananda & Proctor 
[2013] for an in-depth look at institutional variables and collaborative processes). 
In their study on collaborative partnership and design, Bidwell and Ryan (2006) seek “to 
investigate the relationship between the structure of watershed partnerships and their activities” 
(p. 830).  Through interviews with the main facilitators of twenty-nine mature watershed 
partnerships in Oregon (i.e. those that were older than twenty-eight months at the time of study),
  11
the authors developed a list of variables that appear to be important in determining whether the 
partnership’s structure affects the number and type of physical tasks that are accomplished by the 
partnership (which can become part of an “outcomes” measure or another proxy measure of 
success all together).  These variables include a number of partnership characteristics (e.g., size 
of watershed, age of partnership, organizational affiliations, presence of a coordinator, funding, 
diversity of stakeholder interests), which are then compared with the activities completed by 
each group.  Key findings include that more homogenous groups “were less likely to complete 
scientific assessments or develop action plans, but were quite likely to conduct watershed 
improvement projects” (p. 834); affiliation with an organization was likely to significantly affect 
a partnership’s activities (p. 840); and voluntary participation does not ensure that all interests 
are represented (p. 840). 
In “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Clarifications and Innovation,” Sabatier and 
Weible (2007) combine concepts from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature in order to define an alternative path to major 
policy change: negotiated agreements.  Information on this type of policy change is included in a 
review of conditions that promote successful collaborative governance processes because Weible 
& Sabatier (2009) specifically define negotiated agreements as a product of collaborative 
governance processes; thus, the authors pre-suppose that the conditions likely to produce a 
successful negotiated agreement must occur in the context of a collaborative governance process.  
In other words, negotiated agreements come into play in situations when “coalitions [that] have 
been fighting for decades” eventually decide to collaborate, leading them to a “negotiated 
agreement representing substantial change from the status quo” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 
205). 
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The authors provide a list of nine “prescriptions concerning the design of institutions for 
negotiating and implementing agreements”—in other words, collaborative institutions—that can 
influence the successful creation of negotiated agreements: 1) incentive to negotiate seriously: a 
hurting stalemate, 2) composition, 3) leadership, 4) consensus decision rule, 5) funding, 6) 
duration and commitment, 7) the importance of empirical issues, 8) the importance of building 
trust, and 9) alternate venues  (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 206-207).  Evaluating the degree to 
which each of these factors exists in a collaborative process can be useful in determining whether 
the process is likely to be successful, at least in resolving disputes among competing groups so 
that they can come to a mutually agreeable outcome.  Interestingly, consensus appears in this 
framework under the assumption that “given the multitude of venues of appeal in most Western 
political systems, a dissatisfied party can wreck the implementation of any agreement,” and thus 
the authors advocate “including [these dissatisfied parties] in negotiations and granting them veto 
power” (p. 206). 
In “Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,” Ansel and Gash (2008) review 
137 cases of collaborative governance “with the goal of elaborating a contingency model of 
collaborative governance” (p. 543), which enumerates a number of major categories of variables 
and important sub-variables that may be useful when assessing collaborative governance 
processes.  These include 1) Starting Conditions (power/resources imbalance, incentives to 
participate, and prehistory of antagonism and cooperation); 2) Facilitative Leadership; 3) 
Institutional Design; and 4) the Collaborative Process (face-to-face dialogue, trust building, 
commitment to the process, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes). 
Finally, Conley and Moote (2003) specifically investigate the ways in which 
collaborative governance processes have been evaluated in previous literature.  They argue that 
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most evaluations “focus on either characteristics of a process, such as inclusiveness of 
representation and decision-making methods, or outcomes” (p. 374), and provide some insight 
into each of these broad categories.  However, these criteria can vary by scale and may either be 
limited or expanded by evaluators depending on their own purpose and preference, and well as 
the context of the process being evaluated.  Although the authors compile a broad list of 
variables commonly found in past evaluations (including clear goals, diverse participation, and 
consensus-based decision making, as well as other environment, socio-economic, and process 
variables), they warn against selecting one comprehensive list of criteria.  Instead, they argue 
that evaluators must make their motives, criteria, weightings, and data collection methods 
explicit in order to provide the most useful evaluations of collaborative governance processes. 
 
Diversity and Representation in Collaborative Processes 
 
One condition that is often named as a requirement for “success,” or at least a variable for 
analysis, in collaborative governance processes by many of the scholars above is the inclusion of 
diverse interests.  Because this research focuses on how stakeholders interact and produce 
outcomes, understanding how the makeup of collaborative groups influences decision-making is 
a particularly important sub-set of literature to hone in on.  Here, diversity entails the inclusion of 
diverse viewpoints that represent all of the important stakeholders, as opposed to ethnic, gender, 
or age diversity, as it is possible that the group may not be diverse in these ways if they all 
represent one watershed area.  Scholars also call this composition (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) or 
representation, which “refers to whether all relevant ideas and interests are included in collective 
choice” and “is the core democratic value associated with procedural legitimacy,” according to 
Sabatier et al. (2005a, p. 8).  Importantly, representation is not necessarily inclusiveness, or the 
concept of putting few restrictions on who can belong to a group, as “a perfectly inclusive 
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process can jeopardize representativeness…if it creates an imbalance in the number of 
individuals representing each major faction” (Leach, 2006, p. 101). 
In the EPA’s (1997) Top 10 Watershed Lessons Learned, the authors argue, “[t]he 
important thing is to include all key interest groups so that you can tap into their strength, 
increase your credibility, reduce duplication of effort, and make optimal use of limited funds” (p. 
32).  Here, diversity is used strategically to maximize available resources.  In addition, Bidwell 
and Ryan (2006) claim, “diverse participation is extremely important if the process of 
collaboration is to result in changes in the management of water resources” (p. 840), especially 
because diverse participation can create a wider variety of outcomes.  Alternatively, critics 
contend that a very diverse membership may bring too many ideas to the table at once and make 
the process unwieldy.  For example, in their comprehensive review of 37 studies on watershed 
partnerships, Leach and Pelkey (2001) found that the fourth most-cited factor contributing to 
success is to “establish inclusive membership rules or to encourage diverse participation” (p. 
381).  However, these claims were contradicted by the fact that “eight studies concluded that a 
large, diverse membership creates serious problems” (p. 381).  Other scholars such as Ansell and 
Gash (2007) worry that even if a process is diverse, power imbalances may exist among different 
stakeholders that prevent them from participating on the same level or even coming to the table 
at all.  Thus, the underlying connection between diversity and success in collaborative processes 
must be further investigated. 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
As mentioned in the introduction, this project aims to understand the conditions under 
which collaborative governance processes can produce successful policy outcomes using 
Colorado’s currently evolving water planning process as an in-depth case study.  The Advocacy 
  
Coalition Framework (ACF), initially developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins
subsequently revised with the help of a variety of scholars, is a useful theoretical framework 
through which to conduct this analysis (see 
with “‘wicked’ problems—those involving substantial goal conflicts, important technical 
disputes, and multiple actors from several levels of government” (Sabatier 
189). 
Figure 2: The 2007 Advocacy Coalition Framework
 The ACF relies on the idea that “stakeholder beliefs and behavior are embedded within 
informal networks and that policymaking is structured, in part, by the net
participants” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 196).  These networks, formally called subsystems, 
are bounded “by both a functional dimension (e.g. water) and a territorial one (e.g., California)” 
(Sabatier et al., 2005b).  Sabatier argues 
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aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organizations 
who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert” to further policies 
that align with their values (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133).  Here, actors may experience policy-oriented 
learning, or  “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result 
from experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives” 
(p. 133).  Actors are also more likely to change their secondary beliefs, or narrow ideas about 
how policies should be implemented, in order to meet collective goals while still maintaining 
their deeper ideological beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  These changes may feed back into 
the system though the effects of policy outputs, which can then alter system dynamics and future 
coalition processes (Sabatier, 1988).  These four concepts—coalition development, belief change 
and learning, hierarchical belief structures, and policy outputs—are especially useful in 
analyzing collaborative governance processes and will be explained in depth in the following 
sub-sections.  While allusions to how these concepts may help to explain stakeholder 
coordination and outcome production in the Roundtable process are included below, these ideas 
are expanded upon in much greater depth in the following chapters. 
Coalition Development 
Fundamental to the ACF is the idea that policy change takes place within policy 
subsystems.  Sabatier (1988) explains that policy subsystems are comprised of “the interaction of 
actors from different institutions interested in a policy arena” (p. 131).  These actors may come 
from both the private and public sectors but must be “actively concerned with a policy problem 
or issue” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 131).  Policy subsystems can vary in size depending on the issue at 
hand, ranging from a variety of stakeholders from one small community to major parts of the 
federal government.  However, these subsystems are often composed of “policy elites rather than 
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the general public,” or people who typically have political experience and knowledge within the 
area in question (p. 144).  This is the case with many participants in the Roundtable who have 
had past experience in collaborative decision-making processes surrounding water or other 
natural resources.   
Sabatier (1988) argues that actors within a given policy subsystem “can be aggregated 
into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various organizations who share 
a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert” to further policy objectives 
that align with their values (p. 133).  In fact, an underlying premise of the ACF is that “the best 
way to deal with the multiplicity of actors in subsystems is to aggregate them into ‘advocacy 
coalitions’” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 192).  While some individuals or groups may not 
actually acknowledge that they are forming alliances with other stakeholders, policy scholars 
will categorize groups with shared goals into a coalition for analysis purposes.  It may even be 
the case that more powerful or senior members of groups sense alliance-building while those 
members less involved with the political implications of the process are less conscious of being 
part of a coalition.  Although there may be many stakeholders with seemingly different views, 
they can typically be grouped into two to five coalitions within the subsystem (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p. 196). 
While the conscious formation of coalitions solidifies relations between actors, it can 
simultaneously emphasize the major points of conflict between groups.  Sabatier et al. (2005b) 
posit the existence of a phenomenon called “the devil shift,” which describes “the tendency for 
actors to view their opponents as less trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they 
probably are” (p. 192).  This, in turn, causes individuals with somewhat shared beliefs to band 
together, support each other, and hence form a stronger opposition to those with drastically 
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different central beliefs.  However, actors may also form coalitions through “[w]eak 
coordination,” which is hypothesized to “be an important strategy for coalitions in which 
organizational membership faces legal impediments that limit formalized alliances” (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p. 197).  In fact, coordinated behavior can simply “[involve] some degree of 
working together to achieve similar policy objectives” (p. 196).  This “weak” or informal 
coalition building may apply to the Roundtables because their official membership is governed 
by the enacting legislation and thus members may not have as many opportunities to build strong 
coalitions with other actors of their choice, as those actors may not be formal participants in the 
process.  Finally, coalitions may be stable due to “stable economic/organizational interests” more 
than their shared beliefs or their desire to coordinate (Sabatier, 1988, p. 142).  Depending on the 
strength of alliances—as well as the level of belief about certain issues, which will be described 
in the next section—actors may change some beliefs while holding onto others during their 
participation in the policy process. 
Hierarchical Belief Structures 
The ACF posits a hierarchical belief structure that consists of the following categories: 
deep or normative core, near or policy core, and secondary (this paper will use the bolded terms 
for these categories, as emphasized in Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  Deep core beliefs consist of 
“very general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature, the relative priority of 
fundamental values such as equality and liberty, the relative priority of the welfare of different 
groups, the proper role of government vs. markets in general, and about who should participate 
in governmental decision making” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 194).  Actors rarely, if ever, 
sacrifice or change these broad, stable beliefs.  In fact, coalitions are often grouped together 
based on shared core beliefs, even if other types of beliefs may vary among actors (Sabatier, 
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1988).  For instance, in their study of water quality policy in the Lake Tahoe Basin, Weible and 
Sabatier (2009) provide an example of two conflicting deep core beliefs: “relative concern for 
the welfare of present versus future generations” (p. 196).  While these beliefs may not change 
often, it is likely that threats to these deep core beliefs may “motivate [individuals] to expend 
scarce resources in policy debates” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 152). 
Secondary to deep core beliefs are policy core beliefs, which are “applications of deep 
core beliefs that span an entire policy subsystem” and include concepts such as the proper roles 
of different governmental members and the priority of various policy-related values (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p. 194-195).  Continuing the example from the Lake Tahoe Basin study, potential 
policy core beliefs of stakeholders might be “relative priority for environmental quality versus 
economic development” (Weible & Sabatier, 2009, p. 197).  Significantly, the same policy core 
beliefs may not always correspond directly to deep core beliefs for all stakeholders, and they are 
more likely to be changed but only over a long period of time.  For instance, while stakeholders 
who hold a deep core belief in protecting the welfare of future generations may be more likely to 
prioritize the former of the above values (“relative priority for environmental quality”), they may 
instead promote economic development at an environmental cost in specific situations.  They 
may also change their priorities if they begin to see environmental costs becoming too excessive, 
for example. 
Within the realm of policy core beliefs, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identify “policy core 
policy preferences,” or highly salient beliefs that span a subsystem and have caused a lasting rift 
within a coalition (cited in Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 195).  These preferences essentially 
“provide the vision that guides coalition strategic behavior” by uniting or dividing actors (p. 
195).  They also serve as a middle ground between policy core beliefs and the lowest level in the 
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hierarchy, secondary beliefs, where belief correspondence may vary greatly.  In this position, 
policy core policy preferences may be “the stickiest glue that binds coalitions together” (p. 195) 
while also being one of the most difficult levels of belief to observe. 
Finally, secondary beliefs are “relatively narrow in scope,” both geographically and 
substantively, and address specific issues such as the causes of a problem, budgetary 
applications, and other specifics about how a policy should be implemented (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007, p. 196).  Importantly, actors are more likely to change their secondary beliefs to meet 
collective goals while still maintaining their deeper ideological and policy-core beliefs.  To 
conclude the example above, Weible and Sabatier (2009) suggest that secondary beliefs of actors 
in the Lake Tahoe Basin case study may include specific implementation strategies such as 
“preferences to restrict development in urbanized areas or to restrict building on steep lots that 
might cause erosion” (p. 197).  Importantly, actors may be willing to sacrifice these specific 
conceptions of how ideas are carried out as long as the overall recommendations that are being 
put into place align with their deeper and more stable beliefs. 
Using the ACF, policy scholars may group actors with slightly different secondary beliefs 
into the same coalition.  In some cases, coalition members may also diverge on policy core 
beliefs, but it is unlikely that they will ever have drastically different deep core beliefs.  Once 
actors actually begin to ally with one another in a policy process, they may experience belief 
change through policy-oriented learning. 
Policy-Oriented Learning 
Within a policy process, actors may experience a phenomenon known as policy-oriented 
learning, or  “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result 
from experience [or new information] and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) 
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of policy objectives” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133).  In other words, “learning” is described as a 
change in beliefs about a policy objective as a result of an experience or information.  ACF 
scholars consider this alteration in beliefs to be one of the major pathways to policy change.  In 
relation to the previous section concerning the hierarchical levels of beliefs held by actors, it is 
posited to be more likely that policy-oriented learning will alter actors’ secondary beliefs, which 
can be changed with relatively little evidence, as opposed to deep core or policy core beliefs. 
Weible and Sabatier (2009) argue that collaborative policy subsystems “provide an optimal 
setting for learning from science and for learning across coalitions,” as actors “cooperate, 
develop trust, and work with scientists in joint fact-finding to develop a shared knowledge base” 
(p. 208). 
Other theories of policy scholarship, such as punctuated-equilibrium (PE) theory, have 
engaged the idea of policy-oriented learning within their frameworks.  For example, True, Jones, 
and Baumgartner (2007) explain that through policy-oriented learning, “opposing groups can 
modify certain elements of their belief structure,” which can lead to “substantial compromise and 
important changes in public policy” (p. 163).  Within the PE framework, this “belief-adjustment” 
can lead to periods that are relatively stable and contain fewer major changes (punctuations) in 
policy.  Importantly, the concept of policy-oriented learning as described within this theory 
recognizes that the values of stakeholders are dynamic and can change over time, amplifying the 
complexity of the policy-making process. 
In addition to the changes or adjustments in belief described above, policy-oriented 
learning may also be operationalized in other ways.  Specifically, May (1992) explains that 
policy learning generally “entails learning across multiple advocacy coalitions, leading to shared 
understandings of the viability of policy interventions and goals” (p. 340).  This includes both 
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instrumental policy learning and social policy learning, which relate to creating new 
understandings about the viability of policy design or the social construction of a policy or issue, 
respectively.  In other words, by observing actions such as a change in policy instruments being 
utilized (instrumental) or a redefinition of goals or scope of the policy (social) within a policy 
process, analysts can assume actors have experienced some sort of policy learning.  Actors can 
also learn from the previous experiences of others who have implemented policies through a 
process known as lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991).  Importantly, when learning through this 
mechanism, actors do not necessarily change their behaviors as a result of belief change; they 
may simply evaluate something that did not work properly or could not be transferred elsewhere, 
consequently broadening the scope of what actions are appropriate for the policy process in 
which they participate.   
Outcomes 
Sabatier (1988) explains that the “end result” of many policy negotiations is “one or more 
governmental programs which in turn produce policy outputs at the operational level” and 
ultimately “result in a variety of impacts on targeted problem parameters” (p. 133).  Inherently, 
the ACF works to explain “factors affecting the reaching and implementing of [these] 
agreements” (Sabatier et al., 2005b, p. 198) by analyzing how coalitions interact within a policy 
subsystem.  Outcomes, which contain both policy outputs and their impacts, are assumed to feed 
back into the policy subsystem as new information, perhaps promoting additional policy-oriented 
learning, which can encourage actors to seek additional changes in future processes (p. 133).  
Thus, although the outcomes of a policy process are organized as a part of the policy subsystem 
instead of a separate variable of analysis (see “Policy Subsystem” box in Figure 2), these 
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outcomes are critical in that they have the ability to reshape external variables and therefore 
affect future negotiations among coalitions. 
Moreover, the policy alternatives available to coalitions may be fundamentally limited by 
the “relatively stable parameters” in a policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1988, p. 135).  In other words, 
the basic attributes or distribution of a good, or the core values or rules implemented in a system, 
can automatically restrict certain alternatives from becoming viable outcomes.  In a collaborative 
policy process with little formal decision-making authority such as that of the Roundtables, these 
constraints on outcomes, especially those that are radically different from current policies, may 
become even more pronounced.  Moreover, challenging the “status quo” aspects of policy can be 
resource intensive, especially when other uncertainties about the issue exist.  “Dynamic external 
factors,” on the other hand, are able to “change substantially over the period of a decade or so” 
and thus have the ability to significantly affect policy change in the face of relatively stable 
parameters (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193) by altering the constraints and opportunities 
confronting a subsystem of actors (Sabatier, 1988, p. 136).  These dynamic external factors 
include changes in socio-economic conditions, public option, and governing coalitions, as well 
as carry-over effects from decisions made in one subsystem to another.  Both these stable and 
dynamic factors can significantly influence the outcomes of a policy process. 
 
Summary 
Four major variables from the ACF literature will be used to inform the following investigation 
of how stakeholders form coalitions and produce outcomes within a collaborative policy process: 
1. Coalition Development: how coalitions form within a policy subsystem and to what 
degree they coordinate their actions 
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2. Hierarchical Belief Structures: whether actors prioritize core beliefs over beliefs about 
policymaking and implementation when making decisions and coordinating with others; 
what levels of belief that actors must converge upon in order to coordinate their actions 
 
3. Policy-Oriented Learning: if and how actors learn from one another in this process, and 
how that learning is reflected in actors’ policymaking objectives 
 
4. Outcomes: what the formal and informal end results of policymaking look like, how they 
can potentially feedback into further processes in the subsystem, and how stable and 
dynamic factors can produce or limit outcomes 
 
While the ACF certainly seems useful for analyzing collaborative processes and the negotiated 
agreements that they may create, this area has been largely unexplored (Weible et al., 2011).  
Following the next chapter, which will primarily introduce the case study on which this research 
focuses, a chapter on theoretical developments is included that uses information about the case 
study in question to begin assessing exactly where collaborative processes fit within the ACF. 
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Chapter 3: Case Introduction 
Colorado Water Law History and the Emergence of the Roundtable Process   
 
In order to understand the purpose of the Basin Roundtables in Colorado’s water supply 
planning process, it is helpful to briefly discuss the complex legal history of water rights in the 
American West and the current major water uses in the state of Colorado.  This chapter will then 
highlight Colorado’s current and future water supply concerns and discuss where the 
Roundtables fit in to the process of developing potential solutions to these concerns. 
 
Historic Water Allocation Regimes 
 
The allocation of water in the Western US has a complex legal history, much of which 
has stemmed from the rejection of riparian doctrine.  This riparian doctrine, which was 
established in Tyler v. Wilkinson (1827) and remains the basis for water allocation in many other 
areas such as the eastern US, declares, “every proprietor upon each bank of a river is entitled to 
the land, covered with water, to the middle thread of the stream” (cited in Hobbs, 1998, p. 28).  
Basically, this translates into the idea that those residents whose property abuts a water source 
have primary rights to use that water, as long as reasonable consideration is given to ensure 
water is available for residents further downstream.  Western water law makes a significant 
departure from this method of allocation in the appropriation doctrine, which relies primarily on 
the policies of “[b]eneficial use and preservation” (Hobbs, 1998, p. 2) and the cornerstone “first 
in time, first in right” rule (Matthews, 2003, p. 40), which will be discussed in more detail below.  
Scholars such as David B. Schorr (2005) argue that principles stemming from historical miners’ 
law and “contemporary radical, agrarian ideals of broadly distributed property and 
antimonopolism” truly underlie the formation of the West’s allocation system (p. 2). 
Fundamentally, western water law is rooted in an intricate system of water rights.  In 
  26
order to obtain a water right in the state of Colorado specifically, three tenets must be fulfilled: 
“1) intent to use the water; 2) diversion of the water; and 3) application of the diverted water to a 
beneficial use” (Abeln, 2004, p. 520-521).  Residents who obtain water rights are allowed—and 
traditionally expected—to move the water away from the stream through structures such as 
ditches and canals, even when they run through others residents’ property, in order to put the 
water to “beneficial use.”  In other words, the “diversion requirement is based on the historic 
assumption that all legitimate ‘beneficial uses’ are off-stream” or inherently extractive (Kenney, 
2003, p. 5).  Beneficial uses historically included providing water for things like agriculture, 
ranching, municipal and industrial uses, and power generation (Hobbs, 1998, p. 8).  While this 
requirement has been slightly modified over time to permit some environmental and recreational 
rights that keep water in the stream under specific circumstances (Hobbs, 1998; Charney, 2005; 
Crow, 2010), historical water law has essentially created a perfect situation for the development 
of “traditional” western water uses such as agriculture, ranching, and mining, which reap obvious 
benefits from the ability to move water away from its source.  Furthermore, the fact that 
Colorado’s Constitution states that all unappropriated water is available for appropriation, and 
that appropriation for a beneficial use will never be denied (Grantham, 2011, p. 2), makes it 
historically difficult for parties to argue that keeping water in the stream is important and 
legitimate under Colorado water law. 
Additionally, the “first in time, fight in right” premise that governs this legal system 
dictates that those who hold older (i.e. senior) water rights have priority use of water over those 
who hold newer (i.e. junior) rights.  In other words, users who allocate water “first” on a river 
system have water rights with earlier appropriation dates that must be prioritized before any user 
with a later appropriation date can receive his or her water.  This “temporal priority” provides 
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water security to initial rights holder who may have invested in complex infrastructure to obtain 
their water (Matthews, 2003, p. 40).  Important to this is the rule that users must continue to use 
their water right or risk forfeiture to the state due to non-use (p. 41).  Unfortunately, this rule 
may discourage users from “improving efficiency, as any water saved (or ‘salvaged’) is deducted 
from the original right” (Kenney, 2003, p. 5).  However, because the user must fail to use his or 
her complete water right each year over a period of ten years, and because most water users have 
other incentives aside from forfeiture to make use of their complete right, the “use it or lose it” 
rule is rarely implemented. 
An additional layer to this complex rights system concerns the priority of uses in times of 
shortage concerning rights that have the same priority date. The Colorado Constitution clarifies 
that in times of shortage, or when a stream’s flow is not sufficient to meet all demands on the 
stream, “those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those 
claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have 
preference over those using the same for manufacturing” (Grantham, 2011, p. 2).  This can 
potentially create a deeper layer of competition among users that hold water rights on the same 
stream, as those who hold senior rights in agriculture may actually have to forfeit water to junior 
domestic users during times of shortage if their rights have the same priority date.  However, 
because junior domestic users in these situations often seek to purchase the agricultural water 
rights in water court in order to prevent this conflict form occurring, this regulation is also rarely 
implemented.  
Importantly, all of these water rights are usufructary rights, which means that water rights 
holders only have the right to use the water, as opposed to exclusively owning the water.  
Essentially, this creates a situation in which water is both a private and public good, or “a shared 
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resource with multiple use rights (i.e. both public and private) existing in it at the same time” 
(Matthews, 2003, p. 41).  This opens the door for water resources to be susceptible to public 
goods problems, specifically those related to common pool resources.  Gardner et al. (1990) 
define a common pool resource as “sufficiently large natural or manmade resources that it is 
costly (but not necessarily impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits 
from their use” (p. 335).  As evidenced by Colorado’s complex water rights system, excluding 
certain users from—or conversely, including only certain users in—using water resources is 
complicated and takes on many legal, political, and economic costs.  Furthermore, when a 
resource is subtractable (i.e. units used by one user are not available to the other users) and has 
multiple appropriators (or people drawing from the resource), it is susceptible to experiencing a 
common-pool resource dilemma; this occurs when rational resource use by all users individually 
(at least in a profit-maximizing way) leads to an unsustainable outcome for the resource users as 
a group (Gardner et al., p. 335-336).  Because water resources are often both difficult to exclude 
users from and highly subtractable, Heikkila and Schlager (2011) argue that officials governing 
state and interstate water resources “need to give greater thought to [Common Pool Resource 
Theory] principles before designing water supply and demand solutions” (p. 462).  Thus, the 
unique aspects of this resource must be considered when examining current uses of water in 
Colorado. 
 
Current Uses of Water in the West and Colorado 
Kenney (2003) argues, “most water issues in the [West] can be summarized by a single 
word: competition. Two types of competition are most salient: between the agricultural/rural and 
municipal/urban sectors, and between human/economic uses and environmental/non-market 
uses” (p. 9).  Each sector is not only concerned about obtaining enough water, but also about 
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ensuring “adequate supplies at desired levels of quality, cost and reliability” (Kenney, 2003, p. 
9).  Colorado’s three major water user groups, as defined by the Colorado Water Conservation 
Board (CWCWB, 2014b), as well as their major points of competition are briefly described 
below.  This is followed by a short discussion about inter-basin competition for water resources. 
Agricultural Uses 
 
According to the USDA’s Economic Research Service (2012), many western states use 
up to ninety percent of their ground and surface water supplies in agricultural activities.  
Colorado is no different in this respect.  On average, agricultural water use accounts for 86% of 
the total consumptive water use in Colorado and also makes up the largest consumptive water 
use in each individual basin; however, each basin still faces some amount of shortage of 
irrigation water required to produce their full crop each year (CWCB, 2014b).  Colorado’s 
agricultural sector produces a wide variety of livestock and crops, which account for $41 billion 
in total economic output each year, according to Davies et al. (2012).  Agricultural land also 
provides “habitat for wildlife and open space” and maintains various “agritourism and 
recreational services” (CO Department of Agriculture), values which are shared and supported 
by many Coloradans regardless of the industry in which they work. 
According to the 2010 Colorado’s Statewide Water Supply Initiative (SWSI) Report, 
Colorado’s agriculture is currently threatened by “buy-and-dry,” or the purchase and transfer of 
water rights associated with irrigated land to municipalities for domestic supply.  The report 
estimates that between 500,000-700,000 acres of irrigated land could potentially be dried up by 
2050 if current trends in urbanization and water transfers continue (CWCB, 2011a, p. 4.32). 
 
 
 
 
  30
Municipal and Industrial Uses 
 
According to Travis et al. (2005), the “West has grown faster than the country as a whole 
for much of the last century, and is likely to outpace national growth for the foreseeable future” 
(p. 2).  Furthermore, “the distribution of the region’s 63 million people is highly concentrated in 
cities…making the West the most highly urbanized region of the United States” (Kenney, 2003, 
p. 3).  Travis et al. (2005) estimate that an additional 39.5 million people will move to the West 
by 2040, a 65% increase over the 2000 census statistics (p. 3).  The primary and immediate needs 
of this growing “New West” population are increased municipal and industrial (M&I) water 
supplies.  However, as of 2005, water for domestic, commercial, and industrial purposes, as well 
as water for industries such as aquaculture and thermoelectric generation, amounted to only 
1,500 thousand acre feet (kaf) per year of total withdrawals in Colorado, compared to 13,800 
kaf/year withdrawn for irrigated agriculture (total with withdrawals: 15,300 kaf/year; Kenny et 
al., 2009).  Thus, although the M&I sectors are still using far less water than the agricultural 
sector, it is these sectors that are likely to see the biggest increase in demand in the future and 
will likely need to seek additional supplies from other user groups. 
Nonconsumptive (Environmental and Recreational) Uses 
 
 Lawyer and legal scholar Charles Wilkinson (2012) argues that the set of inherently 
utilitarian principles that underlie western water law “walls off any ethical obligations to the 
animals, to the inanimate rivers, and to the inanimate and immobile canyons” (p. 368).  This 
concern is central to environmentalists and recreationalists across Colorado who advocate for the 
diverse benefits of keeping water in the stream despite traditional definitions of “beneficial use.”  
Issues for nonconsumptive users occur most often when water is removed from a stream for 
agricultural or municipal supply purposes, which can result in decreased flows and warmer 
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stream temperatures that threaten various riparian and aquatic habitats and the species that live 
within them.  Less water in the stream also affects the benefits that humans derive from rivers 
and their surrounding areas, including natural filtration of drinking water, flood protection from 
wetland areas, and diverse recreational opportunities. 
 Two important areas of legislation concerning nonconsumptive water uses in Colorado 
include instream flow (ISF) rights and recreational in-channel diversion (RICD) rights.  ISF 
rights, or rights held by owners who do not divert the water but rather keep it “in stream,” 
inherently contradict some of the most fundamental historical tenets of Colorado water law.  
Basically, preserving water for ISF fails to meet all three requirements stated above that are 
necessary to obtain a water right: “1) intent to use the water; 2) diversion of the water; and 3) 
application of the diverted water to a beneficial use” (Abeln, 2004, p. 520-521).  However, the 
state of Colorado modified this legal framework in 1973 to allow for ISF rights to fall under the 
category of a beneficial use in certain limited circumstances that help “correlate the activities of 
mankind with reasonable preservation of the natural environment” (Charney, 2005, p. 2).  Still, 
“instream flow uses are generally looked upon as secondary to consumptive uses, or those which 
capture and control the stream in order to put it to beneficial use” (Almy and Shellhorn, 2007, p. 
512).  Additionally, because ISF rights generally have very junior appropriation dates, all users 
senior to the ISF right holder can withdraw their allotted quantity of water first, leaving little to 
no water for the ISF in some cases; however, the ISF right does become senior to all new water 
rights allocated on the stream in the future, which may provide some protection against further 
development of the water. 
Moreover, Colorado has recently recognized recreational in-channel diversion (RICD) 
water rights, or rights that allot and protect stream flows for very specific recreational purposes 
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(Crow, 2010), as legitimate uses.  Specifically, RICD rights are allotted to “help to establish or 
protect” a community’s “recreational resources, such as white-water boating” or kayaking 
(Crow, 2012, p. 30).  Similar to ISFs, RICD rights keep water in the stream rather than diverting 
it, which is why the application for these rights has been associated with much controversy since 
Golden, CO, applied for the first RICD right in 1998.  Another similarity to ISF rights comes 
from the fact that RICD rights are still quite junior because of their newly granted legal status 
and thus would not hold much weight when holders of more senior water rights “call” their water 
in times of scarcity.  Consequently, despite these amendments to Colorado’s historical water 
allocation system that provide some protection for nonconsumptive uses, traditional consumptive 
uses still hold much power and influence in the world of Colorado water. 
Tensions across the Continental Divide 
 
 In addition to conflicts among water user groups, another major source of tension arises 
from trans-basin diversions (TBDs), which are projects that typically transfer water across the 
Continental Divide from the Western Slope to the Eastern Slope in order to provide for the Front 
Range’s growing population.1  Colorado’s first trans-basin diversion brought water from the 
Eagle River on the Western Slope to the Arkansas River on the Eastern Slope through the Ewing 
Ditch in 1880 (Nichols et al., 2001, p. 9).  Today, numerous trans-basin diversions exist, many of 
them large projects that transport many thousands of acre feet of water between basins each year.  
For example, in Grand County alone, a number of major trans-basin projects (and many other 
small diversions) bring water to the Eastern Slope: the Colorado Big Thompson project diverts 
approximately 220,000 acre feet of water from the Colorado River’s headwaters (approximately 
60% of the river’s native flows), while the Moffat Tunnel diverts 55,000 acre feet of water from 
                                                 
1 TBDs may also occur when water is simply transferred from one basin to another, even if the transfer does not 
cross the Continental Divide, though this is less common. 
  33
the Fraser River (also approximately 60% of the Fraser’s native flows; Klancke, 2012).  
Obviously, this displacement of water has created a situation rife with conflict, especially as 
water resources become increasingly threatened by a growing population and a warming climate. 
Aside from the fact that basin-of-origin loses any return flows from water that is 
transferred out of the basin, the importing basin can use any TBD water “to extinction” (Nichols 
et al., 2001, p. 39).  This means that the importing basin basically has endless opportunities for 
reuse until the water is completely removed from the hydrologic cycle, unlike in-basin water that 
must be used for a beneficial use then released back into the stream for the enjoyment or 
appropriation of other downstream users.  For this reason, trans-basin diversion water is highly 
valued by growing municipalities on the Eastern Slope, exacerbating the existing contention 
between East Slope and West Slope users over existing and future TBD projects. 
 
Colorado’s Current and Future Water Supply 
 
In 2002, Colorado experienced a drought that resulted in some of most severe water 
shortages on record, especially for areas such as the Front Range (Pielke et al., 2005). During the 
drought, native river flows throughout Colorado were reduced to approximately 14 million acre 
feet (maf), in comparison to the average flows of 16 maf, which required the use of 
approximately 6 maf of storage from reservoirs in one year alone (Colorado Foundation for 
Water Education, 2009).  Following this drought, the Colorado Water Conservation Board 
(CWCB) began the “most comprehensive analysis of Colorado water ever undertaken” through 
the Statewide Water Supply Initiative (SWSI) process (State of Colorado, 2014).  This process, 
which initially included a form of collaborative “roundtables,” laid the groundwork for the 
Interbasin Compact Committee (IBCC) and Basin Roundtable process that is the focus of this 
study.  SWSI 2010, the third and most comprehensive report that originated from this process, 
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found that Colorado would likely have a municipal and industrial water “gap” of between 
190,000-360,000 acre feet per year by 2050 (CWCB, 2011b, pg. 5), which would mostly result 
from a predicted doubling of population within the next forty years and uncertainties in the 
amount of water needed for future energy development (Rowan et al., 2010).  SWSI 2010 also 
cited that the default solution to this gap—the “buy-and-dry” of irrigated agriculture, a sector 
which is also already water-short on a yearly basis—“would have adverse environmental and 
economic impacts” on the state (CWCB, 2011b, p. 2). 
The increasingly pronounced effects of climate change are likely to further complicate 
water management in Colorado.  In 2012, the US Bureau of Reclamation released a major study 
that sought to “define current and future imbalances in water supply and demand in the 
[Colorado River] Basin and adjacent areas of the Basin States that receive Colorado River water 
over the next 50 years (through 2060)” in order to help “develop and analyze adaptation and 
mitigation strategies to resolve those imbalances” (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2013, p. 1).  The 
Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study report explicated results such as general 
warming trends, decreased average springtime snowpack, and a “more severe” deficit of water 
supply (which began in 2000) “than any other deficit in the observed period” from 1906-2007 (p. 
18).  Based on these trends, the Bureau of Reclamation predicts that although there may be some 
increase in precipitation in the Colorado River Basin region, the overall area will likely 
experience continued warming and drying, as well as decreased snowpack and runoff (p. 18).  
Thus, appropriate water management in Colorado is critical not only for the future of state, but 
also for the entire region. 
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Case Study: Colorado’s Interbasin Compact Committee and Basin Roundtable Process 
 
Following the initiation of the SWSI process, the 2005 Colorado Water for the 21st 
Century Act established the Interbasin Compact Committee (IBCC) to facilitate statewide 
discussions of water policy and management in order to address some of the complex water 
management issues described above.  Initially, The IBCC was specifically charged with the duty 
of helping the states’ river basins negotiate “inter-basin compacts,” or voluntary water-sharing 
agreements between basins, that could ideally help solve some of the state’s water shortage 
issues (CWCB, 2014d).  Consequently, nine “Roundtables”—one to represent each geographic 
river basin in Colorado plus an additional Roundtable to represent the Denver “Metro” area—
were also institutionalized under this Act with the directive to represent each river basin in these 
negotiations (CWCB, 2014d).  The Roundtable process—as it will be referred to here—is housed 
under Colorado’s primary water governance authority, the Colorado Water Conservation Board 
(CWCB). 
Membership of the IBCC and Roundtables 
The IBCC formally consists of 27 members: two from each Roundtable (18 total), five 
experts from relevant sectors (environment, recreational, local government, industry, agriculture) 
in geographically-diverse locations who are appointed by the governor, one representative 
appointed by chairperson of the Colorado Senate Agriculture Committee, one representative 
appointed by the chairperson of the Colorado House Agriculture Committee, and the Director of 
Compact Negotiations/Chair of the IBCC, who is appointed by the governor.  The Roundtables’ 
core membership is also defined by the enacting legislation.  Each Roundtable maintains ten 
“designated” members appointed to the Roundtable by the counties, municipalities, water 
conservation and conservancy districts within the basin’s boundaries, as well as a member 
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appointed jointly by the Colorado House/Senate Agriculture Committees.  Additionally, HB05-
1177 mandates that each Roundtable maintain ten “at large” members that must include 
representatives from environmental, agricultural, recreational, local domestic water provider, and 
industrial sectors (Colorado Water, 2005).  A CWCB representative, non-voting members, and 
state and federal agency liaisons also participate in each Roundtable.  This conglomerate of over 
300 citizens across nine Roundtables, along with others who participate in the Roundtable 
process without official membership, includes many voices that otherwise would not have taken 
part in traditional water policy discussions in Colorado, making this case an interesting example 
through which to examine interactions and outcomes driven by diverse stakeholder participation. 
Roundtable Goals 
 Each Roundtable must work collaboratively to assess its home basin’s water needs and 
devise recommendations for future water management in the face of uncertainties in climate and 
population growth.  The Roundtables are responsible for assessing the following factors within 
their basin: consumptive water needs (municipal, industrial, agricultural), nonconsumptive water 
needs (environmental and recreational), water supplies (both ground and surface), and any 
proposed projects or methods to meet the determined needs (CWCB, 2014a).  The reports 
produced by the Roundtables are used by the IBCC and CWCB in planning processes such as 
scenario-planning, cross-basin discussions, and preparation for the next SWSI update slated for 
2016 (CWCB, 2012a). 
In this “bottom-up” governance process, the Roundtables most resemble “watershed 
partnership[s],” as defined by Leach and Sabatier (2005), in that each Roundtable “consists of 
representatives from private interest groups, local public agencies, state or federal agencies, and 
researchers who convene about once a month to discuss the management of a stream, river, or 
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watershed” (p. 233).  Each Roundtable also resembles a watershed partnership in that it “holds 
little formal legal authority to carry out projects or prescribe regulations.  Rather, it provides a 
forum in which management plans and implementing actions are negotiated, then turned over to 
member agencies for formal legal action” (Sabatier et al., 2005a, p. 6).  Based on this trait, it is 
important to specify that any “outcomes” discussed in this research are not necessarily executive 
or legislative outcomes.  For example, an outcome might include a policy recommendation that 
has been negotiated among members and will appear in a formal document produced by the 
Roundtable.  Roundtables also have the power to allocate “grants and loans to assist Colorado 
water users in addressing their critical water supply issues and interests” through the Water 
Supply Reserve Account (WSRA) Grant program (CWCB, 2014e).  The requests funded through 
this program, which can be for technical assistance, studies and analysis, or project 
implementation, may also be considered outcomes; yet, much like the aforementioned category 
of outcomes, these are also not formal policy changes enacted by the Roundtables.  The 
outcomes of this collaborative policy process are discussed in depth in Chapter 7. 
Importantly, the Roundtables have recently been tasked with providing insight and data 
on “statewide and basin-specific water values” that will inform Colorado’s Water Plan, the 
state’s first ever statewide water plan (CO Exec Order, 2013).  Specifically, each Roundtable 
will create a Basin Implementation Plan that employs previous data to create “solutions for how 
each basin’s water needs will be addressed at the local level” that can ideally be incorporated 
into Colorado’s Water Plan (State of Colorado, 2013).  However, it is likely that these plans will 
run up against some of the major historical conflicts described above, especially those 
concerning inter-basin issues.  For example, Basin X’s plan may require a TBD from Basin Y to 
meet its water needs, and Basin Y may not have additional water to provide to Basin X.  Thus, 
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the Roundtables must deal not only with issues of intra-basin competition for scare water 
resources, but with inter-basin conflicts as well. 
 
Individual Roundtable Descriptions 
In order to thoroughly examine the stakeholder interactions within each Roundtable, it is 
imperative to understand the makeup of the basins both physically and demographically.  The 
following section will present a short description of each of the nine basins that includes land and 
water use information, as well as any pertinent demographic information related to the 
occupations and economic status of the basin’s residents that could affect the relevant values that 
they bring to the Roundtable.  The needs of each basin, as defined in the SWSI 2010 report, are 
also included in these descriptions. 
Arkansas Basin 
 The Arkansas Basin encompasses a large portion of southeastern Colorado.  In fact, it is 
Colorado’s largest basin, covering almost one-third of the state’s land area (CWCB, 2011a). The 
Arkansas River, the basin’s major water source, is divided between Colorado (60%) and Kansas 
(40%) according to the Arkansas River Compact of 1948.  The basin’s land is mainly grassland 
and forest, with steep slopes in western half of the basin and relatively flat plains in the eastern 
half (CWCB, 2009a).  While the basin is quickly undergoing urbanization—estimates show that 
the population may grow by almost half a million people between 2000-2030—the major land 
use is still agriculture, of which about one-third is irrigated (CWCB, 2011a). 
 While completing assessments for the Statewide Water Supply Initiative (SWSI) in 2010, 
the Arkansas Basin identified various water issues within the basin including little water for new 
uses, difficulty obtaining new sources of water, competition between agricultural and 
recreational water interests, and concerns about water quality in the lower part of the basin.  
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These issues will be exacerbated if the population does grow as quickly as expected, leaving the 
Arkansas Basin approximately 93,000 acre feet short of what is needed for growing M&I 
(municipal and industrial) and SSI (self-supplied industrial) sectors.  Therefore, this basin will 
need to rely on water projects such as the Southern Delivery System and the Arkansas Valley 
Conduit, as well as on economic growth and conservation measures, to meet their future water 
needs. 
Colorado Basin 
 The Colorado Basin, located west of the Continental Divide, encompasses the headwaters 
of the mighty Colorado River.  However, Colorado is responsible for sending more than half of 
the river’s flows to upper and lower basin states, as described in the Colorado River Compact of 
1922, and to Mexico (CWCB, 2009b).  Eighty-five percent of the land in this basin is rangeland 
and forest, and major activities include grazing, recreation, and mining (CWCB, 2011a). 
 SWSI 2010 identified the following water needs in the Colorado Basin: potential compact 
shortages and reductions of in-basin supplies in times of drought, concern over development of 
trans-basin projects, and worries about water quality related to selenium and salinity levels.  The 
basin also cites recreational/environmental and lower basin agricultural water use (in the Grand 
Valley), as well as the continued success of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish 
Recovery Program, as important considerations when assessing the available water supply.  The 
population of this basin is expected to grow by a quarter million people—or an astounding 
99%—between 2000 and 2030, which will require an additional 61,900 acre feet of water each 
year to meet M&I and SSI requirements alone (CWCB, 2009b). 
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Gunnison Basin 
 The Gunnison Basin in western Colorado is largely forested (52%) and contains only 
5.5% of cultivated land, which is located in the upper area of the basin (CWCB, 2011a).  The 
population of the basin is expected to grow by 82% (72,900 people) between 2000 and 2030, 
increasing M&I/SSI demand by 14,900 acre feet (CWCB, 2009c).  
 The Gunnison Basin addressed several water needs in SWSI 2010 including garnering 
additional water supplies in the face of growth near the headwaters and managing the impacts of 
future trans-basin diversions.  The basin is also highly concerned with the northern area where 
most of the agriculture takes place.  Currently, they lack the financial resources to fully address 
agricultural water shortages and expect to see drastic land use changes in that area as population 
continues to grow.  Finally, the Gunnison Basin prioritizes resolving federal issues with 
reservoirs and endangered species, as well as managing selenium content in water. 
Metro (Denver) 
 Metro is the only non-geographical “basin” of the nine designated roundtables.  The 
Metro Roundtable represents Denver’s unique water needs as a major urban center, although the 
city technically lies within the South Platte Basin.  Thus, the basic geography and hydrology of 
the Metro Basin will be described in the summary of the South Platte Basin.  However, specific 
water needs of the Metro area include finding “alternatives to permanent agricultural dry-up,” 
addressing “renewable supplies for Denver Basin groundwater users, identifying “opportunities 
to optimize existing and future water supply infrastructure,” successfully implementing an 
“endangered species program to protect existing and future in-basin uses,” and ensuring water 
for future M&I, agricultural, environmental, and recreational needs (CWCB, 2012b, p. 1).  With 
an expected population of 4.1 million residents by 2050 (consistent 2030 data not available for 
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Metro), meeting these diverse needs will be a challenge. 
North Platte Basin 
 The North Platte Basin, located in north central Colorado, is the smallest basin with 
regard to geographical land area.  The basin’s land use mainly consists of forests (46%), 
shrubland (24%), and grassland (17%), leaving only 13% of its land for other uses including 
residential and commercial use (CWCB, 2011a).  The basin’s major water source, the North 
Platte River, is divided equally among Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming.  This area also 
receives a limited amount of water from the Laramie River.  The North Platte Basin is the only 
basin truly concerned with lack of growth and economic development, as it is estimated to grow 
by only 25% to a total of 2,000 people between 2000-2030 (CWCB, 2009d).  
 According to the SWSI 2010 assessment, the North Platte Basin needs to address issues 
concerning municipal water storage and rights classifications, unappropriated waters, potential 
impacts from coal-bed methane development, and the amount of land that can be irrigated using 
the apportionments from the North Platte and Laramie Rivers.  Environmentally, the basin is 
concerned with the effects of forest fires and pine beetles, as well as the ability to manage 
endangered species issues on the Platte River without reducing water usage.  A lack of economic 
development may put additional financial strain on the basin. 
Rio Grande Basin 
 The portion of the Rio Grande Basin that lies within Colorado is located in the south 
central area of the state and includes the San Luis Valley.  Surrounded by heavily forested 
mountains, the San Luis valley contains more than 600,000 acres of irrigated land used primarily 
for agricultural purposes such as potato production, as well as shrubland (24%) and grassland 
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(31%) (CWCB, 2011a).  The waters of the Rio Grande are divided in three compacts, including 
the 1938 Rio Grande Compact with New Mexico. 
 As a result of the Rio Grande Compact and extended drought in the region, SWSI 2010 
explains that general water sustainability in the basin is a difficulty.  Groundwater used for 
agriculture is particularly unsustainable, but the basin fears the economic impacts of reducing 
this dominant sector.  Additionally, the basin is growing, especially in the South Fork area.  The 
population is estimated to grow by 35%, or 62,700 people, between 2000 and 2030 (CWCB, 
2009e).  While M&I and SSI demand is only expected to increase by 4,300 acre feet by 2030, the 
conversion to basin-wide sustainable water sources will require many thousands of additional 
acre feet of water. 
South Platte Basin 
 The South Platte Basin, which encompasses the Republican River Basin, is an extremely 
diverse area in northeastern Colorado.  Its waters serve the region with both the greatest 
concentration of both population (Denver, whose needs are represented specifically in by the 
Metro Roundtable) and agricultural lands (CWCB, 2011a).  The waters of the South Platte River 
originate from the northern area of the Eastern Slope and wind through the Denver metropolitan 
area toward the Nebraska state line.  Although water from the South Platte is shared with 
Nebraska, the basin requires additional supplies from various trans-basin diversions.  Between 
2000 and 2030, the population of the basin is expected to grow by 2 million people, or 65%, 
requiring 409,700 additional acre feet of water to meet M&I and SSI needs (CWCB, 2009f). 
 Many of the issues identified for the South Platte Basin in SWSI 2010 are rooted in the 
competition for water between agriculture and urban interests (CWCB, 2011a).  For example, the 
South Platte region must serve rural communities as well as urban areas such as Aurora and 
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Douglas County, which have grown rapidly in recent decades.  Due to the lack of new water 
storage capacity, these expanding areas have come to rely on non-renewable groundwater 
resources managed by multiple small municipal water districts.  While water reuse and 
conservation may help supply urbanized areas, agricultural supplies are increasingly threatened.  
The South Platte Basin also relies on water coverage provided by the Endangered Species Act 
through projects such as the Upper Colorado Endangered Fish Recovery Program and the Platte 
River Recovery Implementation Program. 
Southwest Basin 
 The Southwest Basin, made up of the Dolores, San Juan, and San Miguel River Basins, 
encompasses the southwest corner of Colorado.  The rugged terrain of the region includes “high 
plateaus with deeply incised canyons and dry arroyos,” as well as mesas, canyons and mountains 
(CWCB, 2011a, p. 1.10).  While three-quarters of the basin consists of forest and shrubland, the 
agriculture and ranching industries dominate in lower elevations, and the tourism and recreation 
industries are growing in other areas.  Aside from obligations to share water through the 
Colorado River Compact, there are also additional compacts that appropriate some the water 
originating in this basin to New Mexico and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain tribes. 
 The basin’s water needs, as described in SWSI 2010, truly demonstrate the region’s 
diversity by highlighting population growth, agricultural strongholds, and growing recreation and 
tourism.  Moreover, the basin is expected to grow by 87% between 2000 and 2030, adding an 
additional 80,700 people and increasing M&I and SSI needs by 18,800 acre feet (CWCB, 
2009g).  While the basin technically has water to supply their needs, insufficient infrastructure 
and consideration of the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program and the San 
Juan River Basin Recovery Implementation Program remain as challenges for the basin. 
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Yampa/White/Green Basin 
 The Yampa/White/Green Basin, located in northwest Colorado and south-central 
Wyoming, “contains diverse landforms including steep mountain slopes, high plateaus, rolling 
hills, incised sandstone canyons, and broad alluvial valleys and floodplains” (CWCB, 2011a, p. 
1.10).  The basin’s diverse industries include livestock, grazing, agriculture, and recreation—
especially the destination ski resort located in Steamboat Springs.  While this area in particular is 
expected to grow continuously, the overall the basin is only predicted to grow by 56%, or 22,100 
people, between 2000-2030 (CWCB, 2010).  This requires an increase of 22,300 acre feet of 
water for M&I and SSI. 
 In SWSI 2010, the Yampa/White/Green Basin identified a large variety of water needs in 
the municipal, industrial, recreational/tourism, and agricultural sectors.  These include water for 
the following uses: gas and oil shale development and associated increased municipal use, 
continued power production, and agriculture (CWCB, 2011a).  However, because the 
Yampa/White/Green basin is not growing as rapidly as the other basins, there is a shortage of 
financial resources and concerns about reduced allotment in comparison to other basins in the 
event of a “compact call” on the Colorado River.  The Yampa/White/Green is also implementing 
the Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, which requires protection of 
instream flows currently and into the future. 
 
Summary 
 It is obvious from these short descriptions that there are many conflicting values, goals, 
and needs among basins concerning water resources.  For example, many basins cite that they 
want to maintain or expand agriculture, yet they may be restricted by the finances necessary to 
provide water and infrastructure for this resource-intensive activity.  For the majority of the 
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basins—except perhaps the North Platte and to some extent the Yampa/White/Green, who are 
concerned about lack of population and consequent economic growth—meeting the municipal 
and industrial needs of an increasing population is being prioritized to some extent instead.  This 
may also involve setting aside more water for recreational uses that drive part of a basin’s 
economy, especially for Western Slope basins.  Moreover, various basins cited the Upper 
Colorado River Native Fish Recovery Program, as well as other endeavors to protect native 
species by means such as maintaining instream flows, as a challenge when figuring out how to 
efficiently manage their water supply in a way that satisfies all users.  A few of the basins—
particularly the Rio Grande Basin—must also deal with the challenge of finding a water source 
that is more sustainable than current sources such as non-renewable groundwater or “extra” 
water that technically belongs to another entity through an inter-state compact.  Ideally, the 
IBCC and Roundtables attempt to meet all of the basins’ respective needs to some extent by 
finding locally-focused, collaborative, and innovative strategies to deal with Colorado’s water 
issues while also working within the confines of the complex set of laws that govern Colorado’s 
water resources and the issues of resource scarcity now and into the future. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Developments 
Using the ACF to Analyze Collaborative Governance Processes 
In the 2007 update to the ACF, Sabatier & Weible (2007) explain that the framework 
“must be modified to identify the conditions under which—in the absence of major external or 
internal perturbation—agreements involving policy core changes are crafted among previously 
warring coalitions” (p. 205).  In other words, they are interested in understanding how negotiated 
agreements fit best into the ACF, a framework that traditionally focuses on opposing coalitions 
rather than collaborative ones (see “Policy Subsystem” box of Figure 2, reproduced below).  
ACF scholars hypothesize that negotiated agreements arise from collaborative policy 
subsystems, which are created in response to a “hurting stalemate” situation between adversarial 
coalitions in an existing policy subsystem (Weible & Sabatier, 2009; Weible et al., 2012; Weible 
& Nohrstedt, 2012).  In other words, “coalitions that have been fighting for decades” (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007, p. 205) eventually come to a point where there are completely “dissatisfied with 
the status quo and perceive no alternate venues for achieving their objectives” (Weible & 
Sabatier, 2009, p. 198); consequently, previously adversarial coalitions decide to engage in 
collaboration and attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable outcome among themselves. 
Since then, there has been little explicit consideration of where collaborative processes 
and the negotiated agreements they strive to produce fit into the ACF, despite the fact that the 
ACF continues to be seen as a valid framework by which to analyze these types of policy 
processes.  In fact, in their reflections on twenty-five years of the ACF’s use, Weible et al., 
(2011) specify negotiated agreements as one of the “rarely explored areas” of framework in need 
of further study (p. 357).  Thus, this research seeks to provide insight into where collaborative 
policy processes (and consequently, negotiated agreements) fit into the ACF.  
  
Figure 2 (reproduced): The 2007 Ad
McQueen, 
In order to justify that Colorado’s Roundtable process
most contentious and adversarial issues in Western US
collaboration to examine in response to this gap
which to distinguish a collaborative subsystem from an adversarial subsystem.  Weible and 
Sabatier (2009) provide characteristics of collaborative subsystems that are useful here, including 
the presence of “cooperative coalitions with some level of belief convergence and cross
coordination” that share decision
devise solutions that are “win-win and voluntary” (p. 197
“consensus-based institutions play a major role in building trust, goodwill, and mutual 
understanding of the different values” through strategies such a
rules, open entry rules, fair rules of negotiation, decision rules based on consensus, and joint 
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vocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram (Weible, Sabatier, & 
2009), © John Wiley and Sons. 
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fact-finding procedures that integrate scientists and nonscientists in decision making” (Weible & 
Sabatier, 2009, p. 198).  However, the authors say little about the formation of these 
collaborative subsystems aside from the fact that they may arise from hurting stalemates in 
adversarial policy subsystems, as mentioned above.  Weible and Sabatier (2009) describe 
adversarial subsystems as having polarized beliefs and little coordination, as well as “fragmented 
authority among governments or government agencies that are aligned with one of the 
competitive coalitions” (p. 197).  Moreover, participants in adversarial subsystems often seek 
any venue in which they may be able to create a policy with clearly defined winners and losers. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the Roundtable process surrounds an extremely 
controversial issue that often results in much contention among stakeholders (as described in 
Chapter 3), the structure of the process itself fits the characteristics of a collaborative policy 
subsystem much more closely than that of an adversarial subsystem—and importantly, it was 
intentionally designed to do so from the start.  Because of this, the Roundtable process is even 
different than many other collaborative processes: it was created in response to a wide variety of 
factors, including drought and water shortages as well as long-standing social, political, and 
economic attitudes about water management and policy, rather than in response to one specific 
issue that had existing policy participants divided by deep, adversarial lines (as compared to the 
two adversarial coalitions described by Weible and Sabatier [2009] in the Lake Tahoe case).  
Moreover, many new policy participants entered the collaborative Roundtable process without 
necessarily participating in any kind of adversarial system related to this topic in the past for one 
reason or another.  Thus, when determining whether a policy subsystem is collaborative or 
adversarial, it is important to look beyond the topic being examined within the process and 
instead at the process itself, including the motivations for creating the process.  Based on these 
  49
criteria, the Roundtable process not only serves as an example of a collaborative subsystem that 
is ripe for examination through the ACF, but it also suggests that collaborative subsystems do not 
necessarily have to evolve from initially adversarial subsystems and may vary in “degree of 
collaboration” along a spectrum. 
 
Specific ACF Variables and Proposed Relationships Relevant to Collaborative Processes 
Consensus Variables 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) discuss a modification that was made to the ACF since 1999 
concerning a group of variables termed “long term coalition opportunity structures,” which 
includes two variables that expand the “context within which coalitions operate”: degree of 
consensus needed for major policy change and openness of political system (p. 197).2  While the 
authors explain that this new group of variables was created in response to criticisms that the 
ACF was only applicable to policy processes in the American context, they more broadly 
recognize that these variables “mediate between stable system parameters and the subsystem” (p. 
199) and can play a key role in recognizing how stable parameters influence subsystem 
formation.  With specific attention to the “degree of consensus” variable, the authors recognize 
that some political systems, such as those in Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands, have “a 
very strong norm for consensus,” and thus likely have more incentive “to be inclusive (rather 
than exclusive), to seek compromise and share information with opponents, and generally to 
minimize the devil shift” (p. 200).  In other words, subsystems that have a greater degree of 
consensus required for major policy change are more likely to tend toward collaborative-type 
processes. 
                                                 
2 One of the earliest versions of the framework mediated between stable parameters and external system events 
using a general variable called “Constraints and Resources of Subsystem Actors” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 132), which 
was separated and detailed over time into both “Long Term Coalition Opportunity Structures” and “Short Term 
Constrains and Resources,” as seen in Figure 2.  
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Emphasizing the relationship between the “degree of consensus needed for major policy 
change” and the consequent subsystem dynamics can also be extremely important when 
analyzing collaborative governance processes within the US political system that set consensus-
based norms similar to those more broadly expected in other political contexts.  For example, the 
Roundtable process and other processes that are initiated in a within a collaborative framework 
and rely primarily on consensus-based decision-making norms may produce different subsystem 
structures in which coalitions use resources and strategies differently (this will be addressed in 
more detail below).  Thus, paying specific attention to “coalition long-term opportunity 
structures” and better understanding how they mediate between stable parameters and the 
subsystem may be an importance place to begin examining where collaborative processes fit into 
the ACF. 
Subsystem Structure Variables 
As alluded to above, ACF scholars posit a direct link between “long term coalition 
opportunity structures” and the “policy subsystem;” consequently, collaborative processes may 
produce different subsystem structures than those traditionally hypothesized by the ACF.  
Specifically, individual coalitions may be more loosely defined within a collaborative policy 
subsystem than those in an adversarial subsystem for a number of reasons.  For instance, because 
participants in a collaborative process often work under the norm of attempting to reach a high 
level of consensus, which ideally encourages them to seek places of belief-overlap where they 
can coordinate their actions, they may be less inclined to form highly separated and adversarial 
coalitions that undermine this norm.  Participants in collaborative processes may also be required 
to share resources and interact regularly, consequently encouraging widespread collaboration 
among all members rather than the development of two or more groups in direct opposition to 
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one another.  Thus, instead of resulting in the “Coalition A” versus “Coalition B” format seen in 
the policy subsystem box of the ACF schematic that specifically separates coalitions’ beliefs, 
strategies, and resources (Figure 2), collaborative policy processes might produce a subsystem 
with a number of weaker coalitions that actually overlap in some areas but not in others and 
share beliefs, resources, and strategies to some extent (see Figure 3).  
For instance, in the case of the Roundtables, financial resources are a category of 
resources in which sharing must occur among coalitions.  While some stakeholders may obtain 
some external funding to achieve their goals (for example, by having an organization external to 
the Roundtables fund half of a proposed project so the Roundtable has to provide fewer shared 
resources), much of the funding for the process comes from the State of Colorado through the 
CWCB.  Because of this, actors must work together to share this financial resource among all 
participants to achieve both their collective and individual goals. 
The research objectives detailed in the next chapter allude to both consensus variables 
and subsystem structure variables as described above in order to determine how collaborative 
processes in general, and processes that did not emerge from an adversarial subsystem 
specifically, fit within the ACF framework.  Discussions of the data collected (Chapters 6 and 7) 
will reflect on these arguments concerning the increased emphasis on consensus and the potential 
for loose and overlapping coalitions with some shared beliefs, strategies, and resources in order 
to determine how these variables affect the trajectories of different Roundtables and the 
Roundtable process as a whole. 
On a final note, because many collaborative governance processes are nested within 
larger, multi-level governance and decision-making regimes, it is useful to highlight that 
subsystem structure may vary greatly based on the level of governance being examined,
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Figure 3: Schematic of the predicted effect that different degrees of consensus needed for major policy change may have on subsystem 
structure, specifically on coalition structure, beliefs, resources, and strategy. Advocacy Coalition Framework Flow Diagram on left from 
Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009), © John Wiley and Sons. Gray boxes on right are original. 
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despite the fact that the general context and some participants may be shared among levels.  For 
example, in the Roundtable process, analyzing the degree of consensus needed within a 
Roundtable to move forward with policy change on the intra-basin level, versus the degree of 
consensus needed among Roundtables to move forward with policy change on a inter-basin or 
statewide level may result in two completely different subsystem structures, despite the fact that 
these levels of governance are nested and share context and participants.  This concept is crucial 
when considering that even though the Roundtables are each working on governing resources in 
their individual basins, they must also work across Roundtables in a variety of ways, such as 
ensuring their “policy solutions” do not inherently negate one another (e.g. two Roundtables 
want to using the same water for their own separate solutions), especially in the context of the 
development of Colorado’s Water Plan.  While this research does not specifically analyze the 
degree of consensus needed between Roundtables to move forward, examining the subsystem 
structure that emerges surrounding inter-Roundtable interactions, as well as the inherent 
interconnections among these levels of governance, will be a rich area for investigation as 
Roundtables begin to collaborate with one another in statewide planning processes during 2014-
2015. 
Figure 4 below represents one potential example of a nested governance system, in which 
the collaborative, bottom-up Roundtable process (Level 1) is nested within a more traditional, 
top-down governance process (Level 2) that requires a lower degree of consensus among 
participants in order to move forward with policy-making.  Depending on actions taken by the 
CWCB and State of Colorado once the Roundtables submit their Basin Implementation Plans, 
the process of creating Colorado’s Water Plan—in which the Roundtables will be inherently 
nested—may reflect this disparity in subsystem structure.  However, if norms of collaboration 
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and consensus are adopted by those at Level 2, the two nested processes will have more similar 
subsystem structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An example of how the Roundtable process could potentially be nested within a more 
traditional, top-down policy process that requires a low degree of consensus and consequently 
produces a different subsystem structure, despite sharing context and some participants. 
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Chapter 5: Research Design and Methods 
 
Research Design 
 
Broadly, this study addresses the conditions under which collaborative governance 
processes can produce successful policy outcomes.  The following major research objectives 
(ROs) and sub-questions have been proposed in order to investigate this overarching question: 
RO1: To understand if and how stakeholder values are effectively reconciled in a 
collaborative process. 
• RO1.1: Are coalitions formed among stakeholders in a collaborative setting and how are 
they formed? 
• RO1.2: Do stakeholders prioritize certain goals/beliefs over others when making 
collaborative decisions? 
• RO1.3: Do stakeholders alter any of their values or beliefs after interacting with other 
stakeholders in a collaborative setting? 
 
RO2: To understand how outcomes are produced in collaborative policy processes. 
• RO2.1: What do outcomes look like in a collaborative policy process? 
• RO2.2: How are proposed outcomes limited by stable parameters, such as distribution of 
the good in question? 
• RO2.3: What role does consensus play in producing outcomes in a collaborative process? 
• RO2.4: Do outcomes reflect recommendations that reinforce the status quo or 
recommendations that vary greatly from the status quo? 
 
These research objectives and sub-questions will be investigated through a case study of 
the Basin Roundtable process, which was described in Chapter 3.  Case studies aid in creating an 
understanding of “complex social phenomena” in a way that retains the “holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2).  More specifically, this project uses an 
embedded, single-case design, which includes the three nested levels of context, case, and units 
of analysis (Yin, 2003, p. 40; see Figure 5).  This study is situated in the context of themes such 
as water in the West, the Colorado Constitution and Colorado water law, and uncertainties 
surrounding climate change and population growth in Colorado.  The IBCC/Roundtable process 
serves as the overarching case that is situated within this context, and the nine Roundtables serve 
as individual units of analysis.  This design—as opposed to one in which each Roundtable serves 
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as an individual case study—was selected because there are common rules, practices, and 
expectations set out at the CWCB/IBCC level that apply to each of the individual Roundtables in 
question.  Thus, it is easier to view the individual Roundtables as interconnected and inherently 
part of one case as opposed to individual cases in and of themselves.  Moreover, while the IBCC 
is also a collaborative group that contains members from various basins and stakeholder groups 
that could potentially be analyzed to answer the above questions, investigating individual 
Roundtables allows for cross-unit comparisons and the development of a deeper understanding 
of the collaborative process overall, as Roundtable members work much more closely together 
on a more regular basis than do IBCC members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Moreover, this case study adopts an exploratory nature.  In other words, it strives to 
answer the “what” question about a situation with the goal of “develop[ing] pertinent hypotheses 
Figure 5: Research design: embedded, single-case design in which Roundtables 
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and propositions for further inquiry” instead of trying to explain why something happens in a 
certain way over time (Yin, 2003, p. 6).  Because the Roundtable process is fairly new and 
relatively under-studied, this exploratory approach provides insight into underlying trends or 
motivations that should be examined further in future research; attempting to examine a specific 
trend without understanding the broader context of the process seems pre-mature.  Consequently, 
instead of presenting research questions followed by hypotheses, this study investigates two 
main research objectives and a number of sub-questions that break up the main questions into 
more easily analyzable segments, as detailed above.  Hypotheses generated from this project that 
could be tested in the future are detailed in Chapter 9.  
 
Methods 
 
Conley and Moote (2003) argue that “[i]n-depth interviews and participant observation 
are preferred process evaluation methods” (p. 381) for collaborative processes.  As this research 
aims to understand major mechanisms underlying how this collaborative process works or fails 
to work, these two methods have been used to collect data for this study.  Various documents 
produced by and about the Roundtables, the IBCC, and the CWCB were also used to provide 
context, timelines, and background information for this study, though they were not formally 
coded.  Examples include the SWSI 2010 Final Report and SWSI “Fact Sheets” that were 
produced for each individual basin prior to the final SWSI report, as well as various 
informational pages on the CWCB website. 
Participant Observation 
 
Public IBCC and Roundtable meetings were observed by the researcher in order to 
understand the context of the process.  Specifically, the researcher attended at least one 
individual monthly meeting in seven of the nine basins, as well as one IBCC meeting, and two 
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multi-Roundtable meetings (one joint East Slope meeting and one Roundtable Summit that 
included participants from all Roundtables, the IBCC, and the CWCB).  These observations 
provided an opportunity to gain insight into how each group functions, which members appear to 
be key players, and how discussion and decision-making activities are carried out.  The 
researcher did not digitally record these meetings, nor did she participate in the discussion unless 
prompted by a member of the Roundtable/IBCC, which happened very rarely.  Instead, these 
meetings were used as an opportunity to make face-to-face contact with past and potential future 
interviewees in order to build trust and better understand the social dynamics within the 
Roundtables. 
Broadly, attending these public meetings may be seen as a very non-invasive form of 
participant observation, which is part of the broader category of ethnographic methods.  O’Reilly 
(2007) describes ethnographic methods as “a special methodology that suggests we learn about 
people’s lives (or aspects of their lives) from their own perspective and from within the context 
of their own lived experience” (p. 84).  Participant observation, the main tenet of ethnographic 
methods, is defined as “participating in people’s daily lives over a period of time, observing, 
asking questions, taking notes, and collecting other forms of data” (p. 110).  While sustained 
contact with the subjects in question and direct interaction and participation in their lives is not 
necessarily a part of this research project, attending meetings and observing interactions among 
Roundtable and IBCC members, often across multiple settings, is essential for building the 
context of this research and creating a thorough understanding of the rules and expectations of 
the case that govern—to some extent—how the individual Roundtables function.  This practice 
of gaining and understanding of “the social and physical scene [which] provides important data 
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for understanding social relationships,” is known as “mapping the scene” (DeWalt & DeWalt, 
2002, p 70). 
Interviews 
 
Three to four key stakeholders were interviewed from each Roundtable (n ~ 29) about 
how stakeholders on the Roundtable interact, make decisions, and produce outcomes.  This 
resulted in a totally of twenty-eight interviews (one interview included two participants speaking 
at once), of which twenty-seven were recorded on a digital handheld recorded upon consent of 
the interviewee(s). 
Within each Roundtable, interviewees represented at least two—and more often, all 
three—of Colorado’s major water needs groups: 1) agricultural interests; 2) municipal interests 
(local governments, water providers, or industry groups); and 3) nonconsumptive interests 
(environmental or recreational) (CWCB, 2014b; see Table 2 for breakdown of interview subjects 
by Basin and Stakeholder Group).   Importantly, the selected interviewees are not necessarily the 
designated representatives of their stakeholder group on the Roundtable as defined in HB05-
1177, but are rather individuals who are knowledgeable about and have personal experience in a 
specific sector, as well as a history of active past participation and current membership on the 
Roundtable.  Moreover, some interviewees fit into more than one stakeholder group; for 
example, a stakeholder may be considered a “water provider” by profession, but supports 
agricultural interests because of his or her upbringing and family life.  Eleven of the twenty-nine 
interviewees have also been involved either at the IBCC or CWCB level either currently or since 
the time of the Roundtables’ enacting legislation, which provided some informal insight into how 
the varying levels of the Roundtable process interact with one another. 
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Table 2: Breakdown of Interview Subjects by Basin and Stakeholder Group 
Basin Name Basin 
Code 
Agricultural 
Stakeholders 
Non-Consumptive 
Stakeholders 
Industrial/Water 
Provider Stakeholders 
Local Government 
Stakeholders 
Other Basin 
Totals 
Arkansas AR  1  1 1 3 
Colorado CO  1 1 2  4 
Gunnison GN 1 1  1  3 
Metro MT  1 2  1 4 
North Platte NP 1 1  1  3 
Rio Grande RG 1 1 1   3 
South Platte SP 1 1  1  3 
Southwest SW  1 1 1  3 
Yampa/White/Green YWG 1 1   1 3 
Stakeholder Group 
Totals 
 6 9 5 7 2 29 
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Interviewees were selected by the researcher from publically available lists of Roundtable 
members available on the CWCB website, and were contacted at the email address provided on 
the list.  In a small number of cases, the email was returned to sender as invalid or was never 
answered; here, the researcher either selected another Roundtable member to contact or used the  
Internet to search for a phone number by which to reach the participant.  Specific individuals 
were chosen to interview based on their stakeholder group, the geographical location they 
represented (in order to ensure variety), and their role as key participants in the Roundtable, as 
observed by the researcher or mentioned specifically by other interviewees.  Some snowball 
sampling was used when the researcher had a difficult time tracking down interviewees from 
specific stakeholder groups in certain basins.  This method involves "starting with a convenience 
sample of a few research participants and asking them to select others" (Auerbach & Silverstein, 
2003, p. 18).  Importantly, the interviewees were also individuals who were willing to share their 
perspectives with the researcher within the designated period of study and do not definitively 
represent the views of all other members on the Roundtable, or even the collective views of their 
stakeholder groups.  
While the researcher met almost all subjects in person at Roundtable or IBCC meetings, 
interviews were conducted in three modes: in person (n ~ 10), via Skype (n ~ 2), and via 
telephone (n ~ 15).  These options were presented partially for convenience and partially because 
some interviewees requested not to be interviewed in person where they could potentially be 
seen by other members of the Roundtable or of their community.  In-person interviews were 
conducted in both private and public locations, varying from interviewees’ offices to restaurants 
and the lobbies of hotels where the Roundtable meetings are held. 
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Subjects were interviewed in a semi-structured, responsive manner following the 
recommendations of Rubin and Rubin (2005).  This style allows the interviewer to deviate from 
the question guide to follow up on statements that may be vague (i.e. “we reach consensus”) or 
themes that appear particularly important to the interviewee in order to truly understand the 
mechanisms underlying the interactions within each Roundtable.  This method was appropriate 
because the interviews served both investigative (i.e. used to find out what happened in a specific 
process or event) and elaborative (i.e. used to understand why something happened and what the 
impacts are) purposes (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 6).  Interview questions were designed based on 
the major research objectives and sub-questions (see Table 3 for a select sample of interview 
questions).  The questions were also informed by important variables from the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, as detailed in Chapter 2. 
Importantly, each interview represents a snapshot of each basin at the time of the 
interview; yet, the Roundtable process is in constant flux as the Roundtables each work toward 
preparing their individual Basin Implementation Plans.  However, these interviews are bounded 
by an important temporal aspect: they were all conducted after Colorado Governor 
Hickenlooper’s executive order for the creation of Colorado’s Water Plan, but before the 
Roundtables produced their individual Basin Implementation Plans (due in July 2014). 
Data Coding and Analysis 
 
Interviews that were digitally recorded were then transcribed using an “intelligent 
verbatim” style, which in this case signifies that “filler” words such as “umm” and “err” were 
left out of the transcription, but the rest of the text of the selected quotations—including repeated 
words and unfinished phrases—were included.  Because this study is concerned with the general 
themes that interviewees discuss concerning stakeholder interactions rather than the specific 
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Table 3: Sample Interview Questions for Roundtable Members 
1) Can you please briefly describe some of the major activities your Roundtable has already completed, and/or activities that you are currently working on? 
a) Have you thought about any activities you plan to work on in the future (including the Basin Implementation Plan and State Water Plan)? 
 
2) What are the goals that this stakeholder group would ideally like to achieve in the IBCC/Roundtable process? 
 a) Are some of these goals more important than others?  Which goals might you  “sacrifice” in order to      
achieve the more important goals? 
 
3) Are there other stakeholder groups in the Roundtable that you feel share similar goals in meeting your stakeholder group’s present and future water 
needs? 
  a) Have you cooperated with these other groups in any way? 
 
4)  Do you feel that the goals and values of your stakeholder group are easily integrated into negotiations within the Roundtable?  Or, is it a challenge to 
make sure your group’s needs are figured into the plans? 
 
5)  Do you feel that the Roundtable in which you participate generally comes to consensus on issues/recommendations? 
a) Can you provide examples of what kinds of issues consensus is typically achieved around? 
b) Are there issues about which the Roundtable typically has difficulty reaching consensus? 
 
6) Have you (or your stakeholder group in general) learned or experienced anything new during the course of the Roundtable process that has significantly 
changed your goals/values/beliefs? 
 
7) What kinds of recommendations/policy alternatives does your Roundtable usually suggest?  Does this Roundtable stay closer to the status quo in 
recommendations, or does the Roundtable usually make suggestions that vary greatly from the policies that are currently implemented?
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ways in which they describe those relationships (i.e. if they are hesitant or not), this level of 
transcription is both more practical and more easily understood by the researcher and readers.  
The one interview that was not recorded, by request of the interviewee, was used only to inform 
context and was not analyzed formally with the rest of the transcriptions. 
The interviews were then coded qualitatively (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003) by the 
researcher using NVivo 10 qualitative analysis software in order to systematically analyze 
themes and patters across units of analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  A codebook of initial a 
priori codes was developed from the research objectives, the literature on collaborative 
governance, and the ACF literature, especially concerning the major variables detailed in 
Chapters 2 and 4 (Weston et al., 2001).  While this a priori structure was used in order to limit 
the infinite number of codes to a focused and manageable number, the researcher also remained 
open to new codes that arose organically from the data and represented recurring themes that 
seemed particularly important to interviewees. 
Through this process, the researcher developed nineteen “super codes,” or main themes, 
which each contained between zero and six “sub-codes” in order to further specify where a 
certain section of text best fit.  Information that fit within a super code but did not meet the 
specific definition of a sub-code was placed within the super code category for later 
investigation.  The researcher further grouped the nineteen super codes into eight groups of 
related codes.  In order to foster greater intra-coder reliability (Krippendorf, 2004), the researcher 
read each interview transcript approximately eight times, focusing on each group of related codes 
individually.  See Appendix A for a list of codes used in this analysis and their groupings. 
 A summary report was then printed directly from NVivo 10 for each basin that included 
all super codes and sub-codes and the text that was coded underneath each one from all 
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interviews pertaining to a particular basin.  As an aid for analysis, the researcher developed a 
“Summary Sheet” for each Roundtable, in which she first listed the research objectives and sub-
questions along with the relevant codes that corresponded to each objective or question.  Then, 
main themes from the summary report were listed narratively on the Summary Sheet under their 
respective coded in order to provide an organized method through which to view the major 
themes that corresponded to each research objective.  The various main ideas, quotes, and tables 
included in the results chapters of this paper were informed directly by these Summary Sheets. 
An alpha-numeric code follows all interview quotations used in the remainder of this 
paper that includes both the basin abbreviation (from Table 2) and a number (1 through 3) that 
simply represents the order that interviews were conducted in within that basin; it does not 
correlate with the order of the major stakeholder groups listed above.  Numbers were assigned to 
interviewees instead of designating the interviewee’s stakeholder group because of the small 
number of representatives on each Roundtable from certain stakeholder groups and the 
consequent risks to interviewee anonymity.  Thus, a code such as (AR-01) designates that the 
quotation preceding it originated from the first stakeholder interviewed in the Arkansas Basin.  
In addition, information identifying other Roundtable members by name or other information 
that would clearly enable a reader to recognize or easily look up the basin or stakeholder in 
question has also been removed from the quotations used within this paper to preserve 
interviewee anonymity.
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Chapter 6: Results 
Understanding Stakeholder Values in a Collaborative Process 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, this research broadly assesses the conditions 
under which collaborative governance processes can produce successful policy outcomes using 
Colorado’s Basin Roundtable process as an in-depth, exploratory case study.  More specifically, 
this broad research question will be examined through the investigation of two major research 
objectives, each with a number of sub-questions that help to focus the analysis of this case.  This 
chapter focuses on the results and discussion of the first objective and three sub-questions: 
RO1: To understand if and how stakeholder values are 
effectively reconciled in a collaborative process. 
 
In order to understand how collaborative processes can produce successful outcomes, it is first 
important to understand if collaborative processes actually allow stakeholders to do what they 
propose: to collaborate in order to arrive at solutions that benefit multiple members of the group.  
The first research objective digs deeper into this topic specifically by asking if stakeholders 
actually do reconcile their values in a collaborative process, as well as to what degree and 
through what processes this happens.  The following three sub-questions, which are presented 
and addressed individually, provide a focused analysis of this research objective while also 
drawing out themes from the relevant literature discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Results 
 
RO1.1: Are coalitions formed among stakeholders in a 
collaborative setting and how are they formed? 
 
 Sabatier and Weible (2007) argue that in order to form an advocacy coalition, participants 
must “engage in a nontrivial degree of coordination” which “involves some degree of working 
together to achieve policy objectives” (p. 196).  However, this coordination may be fairly weak, 
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depending on the situation and policy objectives at hand (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Thus, in 
order to address this first sub-question concerning coalition formation, interview data was coded 
for “coalition” (COALIT) with specific types of coalitions listed as sub-codes when a participant 
mentioned coalition building, cooperation, or collaboration with another group or entity within 
the Roundtable process. However, interviews were also coded for beliefs (BELIEF) and goals 
(GOAL) held by stakeholders, again with numerous sub-codes to further specify types of beliefs 
and goals, which could potentially provide insight into additional coalitions or collaborations 
between groups of actors that were not explicitly mentioned but perhaps occur when groups 
shared closely related beliefs or goals.  When participants mentioned working with outside 
groups, this text was coded as a description of either a strategy (STRATGY) or a resource 
(RESOURCE), depending on how the participant described how that coordination with an 
outside group affected Roundtable activities.  For example, if a Roundtable member gave a 
presentation at a meeting held by an outside group in order to recruit interested members or 
inform them of funding opportunities made available by the Roundtable, this text was coded as a 
strategy used by a coalition to further their policy goals.  However, if an interview discussed 
seeking outside funding from an organization (to pay for some part of a project that the 
Roundtable was taking on, for example), this text was coded as a resource that could be used by 
a Roundtable member to further his or her stakeholder group’s goals. 
 A large number of coalitions of varying size and structure were identified throughout the 
Roundtables.  One of the most common coalitions seen in the majority of Roundtables was 
between environmental representatives and recreational representatives who collaborated in 
order to achieve some of their common goals, such as preserving or increasing stream flows.  
These coalitions were often formally institutionalized when Roundtables created 
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“nonconsumptive subcommittees” to work together to assess the environmental and recreational 
attributes and needs of a basin (initially for the “nonconsumptive needs assessment report” 
mandated by the CWCB) and then continued from there to take on specific initiatives related to 
their collective needs: 
[T]he real expectation was developing the nonconsumptive needs assessment, and 
when we saw that starting to come through in those early days, X and I realized 
that we needed to make a good commitment to the process. So the expectation 
was definitely there to build and work on the subcommittee and really build that 
from the bottom up. (YWG-01) 
 
I work with X, who’s the [other nonconsumptive] rep, and we have a 
nonconsumptive sub-committee which—along with XX, the engineering firm, does 
all the work on the nonconsumptive needs of the basin. (AR-01) 
 
We definitely coordinated… trying to make sure that recreational and 
environmental issues weren’t completely lost in the shuffle. (MT-03) 
 
[W]e have a very active wetlands committee that has served as the nonconsumptive 
subcommittee on the Roundtable and now is serving for our Basin Implementation 
Plan as well; and it pretty much includes the agencies, non-profits, and conservation 
groups, and interested individuals, you know, federal state wildlife land water 
management agencies and all that… (RG-02) 
 
These nonconsumptive coalitions were especially effective in achieving broader support 
for their goals and beliefs from other members of the Roundtable when the environmental and 
recreation aspects that they were promoting were recognized as economically beneficial to the 
basin: 
And that’s why I feel lucky in the Colorado Basin, because there is such a 
recreation-environmental-economic component and need.  You know, you don’t get 
that in the other basins. (CO-01) 
 
[F]or example, here in Chaffee County… they see a great economic benefit to 
having a state recreation area and a voluntary program. (AR-01) 
 
I think the reason we’ve been able to get a lot more people across the board to do 
conservation is to really recognize that there’s an economic component to this, and 
if we can raise the funds… and pay people at least a portion of the value of that then 
it makes economic sense… (RG-02) 
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And hopefully we can pursue development in a way that protects the recreational 
and environmental priorities that we have on the WS because our economy’s 
dependent upon that. (GN-01) 
 
However, the opposite also holds true in that stakeholders who did not see the nonconsumptive 
uses as economically beneficial to the basin tended to discount them more in discussions of 
policy negotiations, regardless of whether they served an important social or cultural role: 
[T]he nonconsumptive uses will not economically sustain the valley and have 
never, not withstanding the values and everybody loves it and all that stuff. (YWG-
02) 
 
 Another strategy that nonconsumptive coalitions also used was reaching out to non-voting 
members or other attendees of the Roundtable that may sympathize with nonconsumptive interests 
and inviting them to propose nonconsumptive projects to the full Roundtable.  Because these 
people are already somewhat familiar with the dynamics and process requirements of the 
Roundtable, they may be able to make more successful proposals than outside groups who not as 
familiar with these intricacies: 
We’ve got some non-voting members on the Roundtable, and at the time…well, we 
had parks—state parks—people and wildlife people coming to meetings. So 
essentially since they were aware of what was going on, we let them know there 
was money available for projects and then they were the ones that initiated the 
actual projects… (AR-01) 
 
So I try to reach out to other environmental folks in the basin and help them bring 
projects to the Roundtable that are asking for nonconsumptive funding… (GN-02) 
 
Most of the other coalitions identified by Roundtable participants were much less formal 
and variable in their makeup depending on the context of what industries and activities were 
particularly important with the basin.  For example, interviewees from two Roundtables in 
particular mentioned that because many—but not all—of the members of the Roundtables had 
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fairly similar values, those members were able to form “majority” coalitions that advocated for 
policy outcomes based on the values: 
As a Roundtable, the Metro Roundtable has, with a few exceptions, really is 
dominated by professional water people, folks…who are tied in with the water 
utilities or delivery, and less some of the other aspects of government. (MT-03) 
 
Most of the guys…are there every meeting and they vote conservatively and for 
agriculture. (NP-01) 
 
However, interviewees most often mentioned coordinated activities that occurred between 
agriculture and another group (e.g. environmental, recreational, local governments), perhaps 
because agricultural water use currently accounts for approximately 80% of all water use in the 
state of Colorado and is also one of the sources that is most threatened by growing municipal 
use.  Table 4 provides examples and analysis of this type of informal coordination between 
groups, as identified by Roundtable participants. 
Some coalitions appear to be so informal that certain members may not even be aware of 
coordinated activity with another group.  This may occur when traditionally opposing 
stakeholder groups recognize, over time, that they do indeed have some shared beliefs or goals 
and end up supporting one another without formally acknowledging any coordinated activity.  
One stakeholder specifically described this phenomenon, where s/he felt like his/her goals were 
closely aligned with that of another stakeholder group’s, yet that other group did not 
acknowledge this connection: 
So we’ve… we’re pretty well-aligned that way, I think, even though [other 
stakeholder group] would say we’re not aligned, but I think we are. (SP-01) 
 
Obviously, there are many different types of formal and informal coalitions that have formed in 
order to move specific policy goals and agendas forward in this process.  However, when  
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Table 4.  Types of Coalitions Involving Agriculture Identified by Roundtable Participants 
Coalition Relevant Quotations Comments on Coalition Formation 
Agricultural & Environmental 
Interests 
“I think the downstream water—ag water—users, 
particularly because of fruit and vineyards, support 
high quality water coming from the headwaters… 
they’re really supportive of nonconsumptive projects 
to protect water quality” (CO-03). 
 
“It’s a good connection between environmental and 
ag interests. [Regarding water diversions] There’s 
the legal risks, there’s the ecological risks, so I think 
they match up pretty well” (GN-02). 
 
“I think that, that some of the awareness starts 
coming, that hey, when we do a consumptive project 
and we’re out here irrigating hay or irrigating lands 
for consumption…that in fact that we are charging 
up the aquifers for late discharge back into those 
streams to keep late stream flows flowing for our 
fish” (NP-02). 
 
“…if you’re in that business, environment is always 
at the back of your mind, whether it’s your own 
farm or where you get your water or whatever it 
is…” (SW-03). 
Users at different geographical locations both gain 
benefits by supporting each other’s needs. 
 
 
 
 
Users face similar risks if they do not support each 
other’s needs in a holistic way. 
 
 
 
Protecting certain water uses may benefit other 
uses at different times of the year; conversely the 
reduction of one water use may unexpectedly affect 
another. 
 
 
 
 
Users value the benefits they personally attain from 
protecting other water uses, even if they don’t 
value those uses outright. 
Agricultural & Recreational 
Interests 
“…even the ranchers up in Grand County will 
strongly defend environmental and recreational 
flows because they make a lot more money off of 
those guys in waders from New York than they do 
on their one cutting of hay” (CO-02) 
Users benefit from water that may simultaneously 
serve multiple stakeholder groups. 
Agricultural Interests & Local 
Governments 
“You know, we have some of the county 
commissioners or representative from the further 
South or East… Even though they’re not an 
agricultural rep, they know how important water is 
to their county so obviously they’re going support 
us… “ (SP-03). 
Users support water uses by other stakeholder 
groups that are beneficial to their community, even 
if they don’t formally represent that stakeholder 
group. 
  
       72
Roundtable participants were asked about coordinating with other members of the Roundtable, 
they more often described “Roundtable-wide” collaboration rather than coordination among 
specific groups.  Important to remember here is that the Roundtable process was initiated with 
the norm of consensus-based decision-making (which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7), 
which encourages all members to work together on mutually agreeable solutions rather than 
create adversarial coalitions that attempt to “win” over one another, a point specifically alluded 
to by a number of interviewees: 
So kind of underneath it all that is it if you get collaboration to happen, all those 
different representatives looking at it from each other’s perspective, you basically 
have the whole group working toward common solutions versus having to fight 
over and see if you can get the votes or something, you know? (RG-01) 
 
 As a consequence, the formation of strong, formal coalitions that could have the image of 
working against the consensus norm may be limited in favor of more broad-based collaboration 
across all groups.  This can lead to a non-traditional subsystem structure characterized by “loose” 
coalitions, as hypothesized in Chapter 4.  Interviewees describe various reasons why (and how) 
this “whole-Roundtable” collaboration occurred in Table 5. 
 Interestingly, some participants saw looming negative effects of this kind of “whole-
Roundtable” collaboration in that it could potentially lead to greater intra-basin conflicts.  In 
other words, stakeholders within a Roundtable work closely with one another over long periods 
of time, leaving few chances for work to be done across Roundtables that promotes statewide 
collaboration, which in turn may actually foster more polarization between Roundtables.  As one 
Roundtable member put it, the stakeholders within his/her Roundtable are “are very respectful… 
of each other,” perhaps because they too often “direct all their disrespect to somebody in another 
Roundtable. And maybe there’s something to that, of having a common enemy” (CO-03).  Another  
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Table 5.  Reasons for “Whole-Roundtable” Collaboration Identified by Roundtable Participants 
Reason Relevant Quotations Comments on Collaboration 
Shared values “So, there’s really kind of coalition between the 
nonconsumptive and the consumptive users.  You 
know, we all recognize that we don’t want to get in a 
situation where there’s a water call.  So, what 
benefits the consumptive users also, for the most 
part, benefits the nonconsumptive users” (AR-01). 
When the Roundtable recognizes that most 
members share an overarching common value, 
goal, or threat—in this case, to avoid a compact 
call on the river—they begin to find ways to 
collaborate that benefit the basin as whole to 
promote that common value (or to avoid a common 
threat). 
Learning “We’ve all learned a lot about the basin and that’s 
why we act so cohesively on behalf of the basin, 
because we’re all linked together through it” (GN-
01). 
 
“…the people who were there to protect their 
interests now have to acknowledge—and I think this 
has been the growth within the Roundtables, that we 
really do need to look at it as a basin. We’re all in 
this together, you know, and so yeah maybe I need 
to give a little bit so you can solve your problem” 
(AR-01). 
Roundtable members learn that water uses are 
interdependent and begin to think on the “basin” 
scale instead of from a particular stakeholder 
perspective. 
 
Roundtable members learn about one another’s 
history, culture, values, etc., and begin to 
understand and support each other’s water needs. 
Initial Suspicion of One Another “And I think every group was representative with us. 
We worked with everybody… they all wanted to 
participate because they were weary of it, of 
course… they were suspect, so they wanted to 
participate and we welcomed them” (YWG-01). 
Certain groups may have begun working with other 
groups because they were initially skeptical about 
the activities of the other group, which then lead to 
widespread collaboration among members. 
Funding Constraints “I think the bottom line is that they can’t afford to 
rehabilitate that reservoir on their own, so it’s 
through the collaboration they’re going to get a lot 
more done than they could on their own” (RG-02). 
 
Stakeholder groups realized that collaborating on 
projects that benefit all members not only makes 
the project more feasible for the Roundtable but 
also helps stretch financial resources further by 
appeasing multiple groups at once.  
External Threats “You’ve probably heard the history of threats of 
water exportation out of the valley… so those 
threats, really, in a really interesting way, coalesced 
the community…and pulled those interests together” 
(RG-02). 
Stakeholders have faced situations in the past 
where they’ve needed to band together to protect 
their basin, so they are in some sense “primed” for 
widespread collaboration at the Roundtable level. 
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interviewee described the issue similarly, explaining that Roundtables have little incentive to 
collaborate with those outside of their own basins: 
I think prior to the Roundtables… folks generally liked each other even if they were 
on the other side of the table. They spent a lot of time together and they respected 
other positions. The thing now is like there isn’t that interaction [between 
Roundtables]; we’re just in our camp demonizing the other side. (MT-01) 
 
Thus, in a multi-level process that involves a number of collaborative groups that must not only 
collaborate within groups but also across groups, extra precautions might be needed to prevent 
the separate groups from “demonizing” one another, a behavior reminiscent of Sabatier et al.’s 
(2005b) “devil shift,” or “the tendency for actors to view their opponents as less trustworthy, 
more evil, and more powerful than they probably are” (p. 192).  Instead of entering into truly 
collaborative agreements in these situations, groups with different beliefs may actually work to 
crystallize more adversarial coalitions on an inter-Roundtable level.  As the Roundtables move 
toward the creation of Colorado’s Water Plan, an effort in which they will truly have to 
collaborate across Roundtables for the first time, this issue may perhaps become increasingly 
salient (see Figure 4 for a visual depiction of this potential situation). 
 
RO 1.2: Do stakeholders prioritize certain goals/beliefs over 
others when making collaborative decisions? 
 
Interviewees were not only asked about their stakeholder groups’ goals and beliefs but 
also about which of these goals or beliefs were most important to have integrated into documents 
such as the Basin Implementation Plans (BIPs) and Colorado’s Water Plan (CWP), as well as 
how easily this was accomplished.  Thus, in addition to coding for goals (GOAL) and beliefs 
(BELIEF), transcripts were also coded for how stakeholders felt that their values were integrated 
into specific activities and the process as a whole (INTGRTN), with subcodes that included a 
spectrum from easily integrated to partially integrated to difficult to integrate.  Although a few 
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stakeholders listed specific projects or even broader values that were the most important to them, 
the majority of stakeholders had a difficult time identifying specific goals or beliefs, much less 
prioritizing them.3  This could potentially be driven by the fact that the mission of the 
Roundtables for the majority of their existence was simply to assess available water and current 
and future gaps within their individual basins rather than prioritize what to do about these issues.  
Only recently have the Roundtables truly been asked to begin defining potential, yet realistic 
solutions to their needs as they create their BIPs and work towards CWP, which many have 
begun to do by creating a list of “goals” and then prioritizing them with the help of consultants 
contracted to write the BIPs in most basins.  Several interviewees volunteered thoughts about 
this process, specifically citing that having to prioritize solutions rather than simply assess 
resources and gaps is difficult for some basins: 
We want to capture briefly where we’ve come from in the last eight years, the 
successes, and identify what now the new challenges are and really focus in on 
prioritizing. Now that makes people nervous. (RG-01) 
 
What are our priorities? What do we really want to tackle? So, we don’t really 
have a good answer. We have these stretches of river, and, that we said “okay this 
is important for recreational, this is important for sort of environmental benefits,” 
but we don’t really know exactly what that means yet. We’re just—because of the 
State Water Plan and the Implementation Plan—we’re starting to delve into that a 
little deeper. (SP-01) 
 
Fingers crossed, we’re rapidly approaching that kind of, if you will, decision-
making time… so if you see the lid blow off the Yampa, you’ll know that we’re 
human like everybody else. (YWG-02) 
 
We really have shied away from prioritizing and that is something at the beginning 
with [the State Water Supply Initiative] in that our SWSI is a kitchen sink… (SW-
01) 
 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, some of the stakeholders that were most willing to discuss the difficulty associated with prioritizing 
beliefs also volunteered their own priorities: “you know, kind of our first priority [is], kind of getting the 
consumptive users to recognize that there are projects out there that are simply standalone important projects for the 
environment and for recreation that they should support” (SP-01). 
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Consequently, from the data collected for this study, it is difficult to understand whether 
stakeholders actually engage in the process of prioritizing their goals or beliefs and working 
adamantly to have their “top” goals or beliefs integrated into Roundtable documents or the 
process as a whole.  Implications of the lack of prioritization, as well as the concept of the BIPs 
and CWP as drivers of prioritization, will be discussed in further sections of this study.  
 
RO1.3: Do stakeholders alter any of their values or beliefs after 
interacting with other stakeholders in a collaborative setting? 
 
 Building on ideas alluded to within the previous sub-question, the ACF predicts that 
stakeholders will potentially change their “lower level” beliefs (particularly, their secondary 
beliefs) when working with other stakeholders in a policy process, but it is highly unlikely that 
they will alter their deep core beliefs4.  Interviewees often echoed this sentiment—that their core 
goals and values have not changed as a result of their participation in the process, but that they 
have found activities and strategies that allow them to cooperate with other stakeholders on in 
order to achieve some mutually beneficial solutions.  Text referring to these issues was coded 
separately to reflect value, belief, or goal change (VBGCHNG).  When stakeholders were asked 
if any of the major goals or beliefs had changed as a result of the Roundtable process, they stated: 
Well, I think, everything’s gotten better but I don’t think much has changed about 
our goals. (AR-01) 
 
You know, people don’t change their core values and it’s not realistic to expect that 
out of a process like this. But I think there definitely is a better understanding. And 
probably part of why you hear so much from people about these multi-purpose 
projects is that one of the places where we’ve really been able to find a common 
interest… (MT-03) 
 
On the whole, I’d say the whole Roundtable understands the goals [of the 
collaborative process], but that being said, everybody has their own agenda… 
                                                 
4 Here, an example of a core belief might be a general preference for more or less government regulation over 
resources. 
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everybody protects their own interests as best they can. But yeah, as a group—
that’s one thing that’s unique about this valley is… when there’s a big problem, 
people kind of work together. (RG-03) 
 
Of course, not all stakeholders are going be completely satisfied under these 
circumstances in which their goals, values, and beliefs are only partially realized in Roundtable 
decisions and outcomes; however, many interviewees in this case explained that they benefited 
from gaining a better understanding of the water issues in their basin and the water uses that 
were important to their fellow citizens, and that this understanding then enabled them to work 
together in new ways, such as through the creation of “multi-purpose projects,” as mentioned 
above.  In other words, these actors may have experienced some degree of policy-oriented 
learning that affected their intentions and behaviors, even though it did not induce a major policy 
change: 
We’ve got to the point where we understand people, each other.  You know, I’m 
much more cognizant of agricultural water needs and the agricultural tradition and 
culture, and, and much more, you know careful how I deal with it, because these are 
important values… (CO-01) 
 
[W]hen this started, there was a lot of Upper Basin-Lower Basin tension… people 
were keeping score about how many [Roundtable seats] from the Upper Basin, how 
many from the Lower Basin… but that’s all behind us now. It’s a very much 
cohesive group, collaborative, as you can see from the results I’m pointing out that 
most everything is done unanimously… so the whole dynamic really has changed.” 
(GN-01) 
 
[A]t some point they’re not the other side; they’re us…. we’re us… they’re not 
different sides… it’s all of us trying to figure out our problems, you know, and find 
that lasting workable solutions. (RG-02) 
 
Based on this trend, the creation and promotion of “multi-use” or “multi-benefit” projects may 
be an important strategy used by Roundtable members, especially those who emphasize learning 
and “whole-Roundtable” collaboration, as opposed to formal coalition building among groups, as 
a path forward for their Roundtable.  Multi-purpose projects also provide a “middle ground” in 
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which stakeholders with different core values can work to collaborate on solutions that ideally 
end up benefitting all or most groups involved.  This change in the type of policy tools utilized 
with in the process is quite indicative of May’s (1991) “instrumental policy learning,” and may 
also signify some degree of “social policy learning” because policy participants have broadened 
the scope of beneficiaries from a given project. 
 
Discussion 
 
Returning to the overarching research objective of this chapter—determining if and how 
stakeholder values are effectively reconciled in a collaborative process—it is obvious that 
through the Roundtable process, stakeholders do learn about one another’s values and even work 
cooperatively with other groups to attempt to further outcomes that reflect these values.  
Consistent with ACF literature, stakeholders in this process do not change their core values but 
do seem to reconcile their secondary beliefs, and potentially their policy core beliefs, with other 
stakeholders, allowing them to work together on solutions that are mutually beneficial.  
However, because many stakeholders had a difficult time identifying their group’s beliefs, much 
less prioritizing these beliefs, it is difficult to understand the level at which stakeholders begin to 
reconcile their beliefs.  While strictly cataloguing coalitions and their respective belief systems 
was not the main focus of this study, carrying out this type of analysis in the future in order to 
better understand how far this belief reconciliation extends would be useful, especially after 
stakeholders more formally define their beliefs in future documents such as the BIPs and CWP.  
A few major points underlying the above findings are important to expand upon here. 
The most formally defined coalitions in the Roundtable process were observed between 
environmental and recreational interests.  These coalitions included official recreational and 
environmental representatives and sympathizers that held other positions within the Roundtable.  
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The strength and frequency of these nonconsumptive coalitions does not seem too surprising, 
considering that the nonconsumptive representatives are often vastly outnumbered due to the 
enacting legislation that defines Roundtable membership (discussed in Chapter 3 and detailed 
further in Chapter 7).  Some nonconsumptive representatives even described themselves as 
“token stakeholders” (SP-01), which may have motivated them to join up with others that have 
some overlapping beliefs and interests in order to show a more united front when attempting to 
further their policy objectives.  Additionally, because nonconsumptive interests have only 
recently been integrated into water planning processes in comparison to many of the 
consumptive interests,5 building coalitions among themselves and then seeking the support of 
others could be an important coalition strategy.  Emphasizing the economic benefits of the 
environmental and recreational attributes that they are trying to protect seems to be a particularly 
successful way to do just that in many Roundtables. 
 The other coalitions that were mentioned by interviewees were much less formal and 
often involved stakeholders simply recognizing shared beliefs and then supporting one another or 
perhaps even working together on a specific project.  This observed pattern could potentially be 
attributed to the argument outlined in Chapter 4 that links consensus-based processes, especially 
those in which participants have some overlapping beliefs, resources, and strategies, to more 
loose coalition structures.  One interviewee even made this connection directly, replying with the 
following statement when s/he was asked whether s/he cooperated with other stakeholders on the 
Roundtable: “we’re not forming coalitions with other groups, and we haven’t had to like… 
because we’re… the way we work, we’re consensus oriented…” (AR-01).  Thus, the consensus-
based structure of this collaborative process seems to push stakeholders toward whole-
                                                 
5 “Golly…when I first got into the water business, it was just what I call the old water buffalos that were in, in the 
water discussions. And environmental, ecological, water quality issues have become involved and that’s good” (SW-
03). 
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Roundtable collaborations that utilize shared resources and strategies (such as seeking out 
“multi-benefit” projects) and away from formally-structured, adversarial coalitions.  While the 
contribution of consensus to Roundtables processes and outcomes will be discussed further in the 
next chapter, this idea could be more formally tested in future work by observing subsystem 
structures for policy processes dealing with similar management issues but working under 
different consensus norms. 
One potential downside to this trend toward “whole-Roundtable” collaboration, however, 
is the possibility that consensus-based processes will typically lead to “lowest common 
denominator” solutions (Leach & Pelkey, 2001, p. 382); in other words, collaborative groups 
will avoid the most important, yet most controversial issues in favor of tacking those around 
which consensus may be easier to reach.  The types of outcomes produced in a collaborative 
process, as well as the inherent limitations in producing certain outcomes under given 
biophysical, social, and political constraints, will be investigated in detail in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Results 
Understanding Outcomes in a Collaborative Process 
 
In order to continue to address the overarching goal of this study (understanding the 
conditions under which collaborative governance processes can produce successful policy 
outcomes), a second research objective is posed: 
RO2: To understand how outcomes are produced 
in collaborative policy processes. 
 
Building on the ideas about value reconciliation and coordination among stakeholder groups that 
underlie collaborative processes as discussed in Chapter 6, this chapter will work to answer the 
second research objective through a series of four sub-questions, each stated and analyzed 
separately below.  Broadly, this information helps to address the overarching research question 
of this study because it unpacks what outcomes actually look like in a collaborative process and 
how these outcomes are achieved by participants, as well as what inherent limitations arise when 
collaborative groups attempt to promulgate certain outcomes.  Understanding these factors can 
help researchers and practitioners alike determine and implement the conditions necessary for 
collaborative groups to produce successful outcomes. 
 
Results: 
RO2.1: What do outcomes look like in a collaborative policy process? 
 
In order to understand if a collaborative process can produce successful policy outcomes, 
one must first understand what the outcomes of such processes actually look like and how they 
may contribute to policy formation and change, as many of the outcomes associated with 
collaborative processes are often not formal policy documents.  Gaining a better understanding 
of what outcomes may arise from collaborative processes can also help shape a more realistic 
definition of a successful collaborative process—something that is often ill-defined and poorly 
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understood, as discussed in Chapter 2.  In order to understand what outcomes look like in the 
Roundtable process, interviewees were asked a number of questions on the following topics: 
major activities that the Roundtable has completed, is working on, or plans to work on (with a 
particular nod towards the Basin Implementation Plans and Colorado’s Water Plan); rapport-
building among Roundtable participants; types of recommendations or alternatives suggested by 
the Roundtable; and places where Roundtable members have seen their decisions, 
recommendations, or ideas integrated into policy.  However, interviewees also mentioned 
outcomes, successes, or results that have arisen from Roundtable work in a number of other areas 
of the interview, including those that discussed goals, outreach, and working with other 
stakeholder groups.  Any text relating to these topics was coded as an outcome (OUTCOME) 
and further sorted into specific subcategories.  Table 6 provides a list of the most common 
outcomes mentioned by interviewees, as well as the Roundtables that mentioned these outcomes 
and examples of how they were described. 
 The outcomes most commonly identified across Roundtables include 1) funding projects 
through Water Supply Reserve Account Grants (WSRAGs), or the budget provided to the 
Roundtables by the State through the CWCB; and 2) learning or teamwork among stakeholder 
groups.  The importance of learning—and the effects it can have on the collaborative process, 
such as encouraging basin-wide collaboration—was discussed in the previous chapter.  The role 
of the WSRAG funding will be discussed here briefly. 
 Aside from being widely cited among interviewees as an outcome, the importance of the 
WSRAG program (and the projects funded through it) to the Roundtable process as a whole was 
reasserted frequently by participants across the state.  In addition to providing money that the 
Roundtables can distribute with few restrictions, the WSRAGs were also cited as a crucial 
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Table 6.  Major Outcomes Identified by Roundtable Participants 
Outcome Roundtables that 
Identified Outcome 
Relevant Quotations 
Policy Documents or 
Tools 
AR, CO, GN, MT, SP, 
YWG 
“So, the Metro has written white papers are on conservation, reuse, and new supply, and 
then that was the framework for the Front Range Roundtables’ white paper” (MT-01). 
 
“…certainly studies and projects that [the Roundtable has] funded are starting to turn 
into policy... Whether we’ll see some sweeping changes in policy on some of these 
things, who knows, but small steps for sure” (SP-01). 
Funded Projects All Roundtables “And so that’s an example of where we took the Water Supply Reserve Account 
funding, initiated a process…that lead ultimately to legislation to try to solve a problem. 
So that goes directly to meeting our need” (AR-02). 
 
“We’re good at spending money… and having a lot of projects in the pipeline” (RG-03). 
Learning/Teamwork 
among Stakeholder 
Groups 
All Roundtables “I think [the Roundtable]’s really been successful on…understanding the perspectives of 
other individuals, whether it’s M&I, or ag, or nonconsumptive uses and how we have to 
coexist and how we have to work together, and how can we best utilize the resource” 
(AR-03). 
 
“And so there’s been this huge communication-education process… I can actually learn 
something if I’ll listen to the other guy for a few minutes” (RG-01). 
Increased Diversity in 
and/or New Forums for 
Water Conversations 
CO, SW, YWG “I think that one success…of the whole Roundtable process has been to bring more 
people into the water conversation, and it has introduced environmental and recreational 
communities to the conversation.  And, it also brought in agriculture and municipal and 
industrial interests as well, and it’s put everybody in the same room” (CO-01). 
Community Building & 
Increased Rapport 
among Participants 
CO, GN, MT, NP “That was one of the biggest things with the Roundtables, was rather than special interest 
groups, we became people. Yeah, it literally, very much more, became a community” 
(CO-02). 
 
“If this process has achieved anything, it has achieved tremendous rapport among 
different stakeholders” (GN-01). 
 
“I think that you spend this much time together, you get to know each other… when you 
develop trust between people even if they have different agendas and different goals, 
they tend to be able to have a civil discussion, a worthwhile civil discussion on how we 
meet those different agendas and goals” (MT-02). 
Public Education (of 
those outside the 
Roundtable) 
GN, NP, RG, SP “I think the Basin Roundtable process around the state is invaluable for keeping people 
informed and educated about water…I think the people of the state of Colorado have 
become better aware and educated about water because of the Roundtable process” (NP-
01). 
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incentive to keep people committed to the Roundtable process.  One Roundtable member stated 
that “the money is the honey that attracts people” (RG-01) to the process in the first place.  Others 
argued that the continued existence of the Roundtables is mostly due to the money available 
through the WSRAG program: 
Well one thing that has kept this process alive not just in the Gunnison basin but 
throughout the state is this Water Supply Reserve Account. That gives the 
Roundtables an actual function… I’m sure it saved the process statewide because it 
at least gave the Roundtables a specific purpose where they could take action and 
see things happen. (GN-01) 
 
Well, and I think part of what Russ George [the man who first proposed the idea of 
the Roundtable process] did was when they created the Roundtables was to make 
sure that there was something to keep everybody at the table—and that something 
was potential money for solutions. (AR-02) 
 
Moreover, the process of deciding which entities will receive grants, and on an even more basic 
level what the criteria are that the Roundtable bases their decisions on, has also created a forum for 
having focused discussions on topics important to Roundtable members: 
Well, I think the grants…tend to drive some of what we do because we have to 
have discussion about the grants so it gives us a way to focus on what our 
priorities and criteria [are]. (CO-03) 
 
However, this is not to say that the WSRAG-aspect of the Roundtables has been free of 
contention.  One of the most frequently cited concerns was that nonconsumptive projects were 
not given as much attention, and consequently less funding, in this process.  One interviewee 
elaborated on the reasons for this, pondering that it might be more difficult to convince people to 
fund nonconsumptive projects because they can be “all about planning and not about shovels in 
the ground” (GN-02): 
[O]ften agricultural needs can be met by like spending money on projects on the 
ground through like putting in new infrastructure…but environmental needs are 
often about letting things be the way they are or getting water back into the 
stream… so our needs are a little bit different than traditional water users and so I 
think that’s one of the main challenges is to translate that. (GN-02) 
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This sentiment was also echoed from consumptive users who preferred to see WSRAGs fund 
tangible projects that provided immediate benefit to water users: 
I like to see the money out doing stuff not studying stuff. (RG-03) 
 
If you’re going to throw money away, at least a headgate is something physical… 
people grew tired of funding studies and spending money on studies. (NP-01) 
 
Thus, although funding projects was widely cited as an important outcome of the Roundtable 
process, it also drives much of the contention within the Roundtables.  However, the fact that 
stakeholders at least have a productive and manageable forum for discussing these issues that 
may not have come to the surface if funding was not available is an essential impact of the 
WSRAGs program. 
Additionally, a number of other important outcomes were identified by interviewees from 
at least two Roundtables, including the creation of policy documents or tools, increased diversity 
of participants and forums for water conversations, community building and increased rapport 
among participants, and public education.  The first of these—the creation of policy documents 
or tools—is perhaps what many would consider a “formal” policy outcome of a collaborative 
process.  For the purposes of this research, documents that were created in response to a CWCB 
mandate were not considered in this category, as all Roundtables were required to complete 
these.  Instead, this category includes reports and other documents initiated by the Roundtables 
themselves such as “white papers,” which provide official statements on specific policy issues 
such as municipal conservation or the development of new water supplies from the Colorado 
River.  Other Roundtables created tools that could become helpful in the development of formal 
policy.  One example is the Watershed Flow Evaluation Tool, a tool used to “assess the flow-
related status of nonconsumptive attributes at multiple locations across a watershed,” whose 
development was initiated by Colorado Basin Roundtable (Sanderson et al., 2012, p. 1.2). 
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Education of the public may also be considered a somewhat predictable outcome of 
collaborative policy processes, as many “bottom-up” processes attempt to get the community 
involved in some way.  Specific to the Roundtable process, the enacting legislation requires that 
the IBCC create a workgroup to address and actualize public outreach and education (CWCB, 
2014c), which in turn helps each Roundtable create ways to educate the citizens of their basin.  
Four of the basins specifically cited outreach activities, ranging from specific outreach 
documents to generally spiking public interest in water management, as important outcomes 
from their Roundtables.  However, according to a report prepared by the Colorado Foundation 
for Water Education (2010), as well as interview commentary from stakeholders across interests 
groups and basins, the majority of Roundtable members see their Roundtable as “less than 
sufficiently effective at promoting public participation in the Roundtable process” (p. 18). 
The final two outcomes mentioned by interviewees—increased diversity of participants 
and forums for water conversations (mentioned by three Roundtables) and community building 
and increased rapport among participants (mentioned by four Roundtables)—are a bit more 
vague and informal.  However, as one Roundtable participant put it, “there are a lot of profoundly 
positive outcomes that aren’t apparent on the surface from the Roundtable process” (YWG-03).  
Further investigating the effects that these types of organizational outcomes may have on 
policymaking is an important area for further study; Sabatier et al. (2005a) suggest that they can 
facilitate the additional outcomes of “creative, win-win solutions” that are less “plagued by 
endless litigation” and represent “greater legitimacy” (pg. 5-6). 
 
RO2.2: How are proposed outcomes limited by stable parameters, 
such as distribution of the good in question? 
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 Although interviewees were not directly asked about factors that limited their ability to 
create successful outcomes, the vast majority of interviewees identified at least one “limit” that 
was related to inherent constraints on the resource in question or to managing this resource 
through a collaborative process.  Commonly identified limits to successful collaborative 
outcomes, along with a brief explanation of the limit and a list basins that specifically identified 
the limit, are described in Table 7.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 4 of this paper, the ACF includes a set of variables termed 
“Relatively Stable Parameters,” which contains the following variables: basic attributes of the 
problem area (good), basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental sociocultural values 
and social structure, and basic constitutional structure (rules) (see Figure 2).  Although these 
parameters do not inherently limit potential outcomes, many of the Roundtable members 
mentioned these variables as constraints.  Text concerning these issues was coded as an outcome 
limit (OUTLIMIT) with a number of sub-codes that further grouped similar limits. 
For example, dealing with a system in which most water is over-appropriated and 
governed by a complex water rights regime (as outlined in Chapter 3) prevented some 
stakeholders from easily testing potentially innovative solutions to water shortage issues, such as 
short-term water transfers from agricultural to municipal use during dry years.  Other users saw a 
lack of information as a fundamental limit because they could not promulgate successful 
outcomes without the appropriate and accurate information.  Still others saw underrepresentation 
of certain groups—especially nonconsumptive users who are often new to the water 
conversation—and limited participation from others as a main constraint on producing successful 
outcomes.  Finally, some interviewees saw political/bureaucratic issues, whether this concerned  
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Table 7.  Limits to Outcomes Identified by Roundtable Participants 
Limit Roundtables that 
Identified Limit 
Relevant Quotations 
Limited Water Supplies AR, CO, GN, MT, 
RG, SP, SW 
“Well, the whole basin is over-appropriated, so we’re water poor basically as a rule… you know we’re 
in a dry cycle and the climate… so that’s it basically” (RG-03). 
 
“I mean, there’s only so much water and the geography of the state isn’t likely to change” (MT-02). 
Water Law, Water 
Rights, and Compact 
Obligations 
AR, CO, GN, NP, 
RG, SW, YWG 
“Because [the Arkansas River is] already so over-appropriated and because of requirements of the 
Supreme Court decision with the state of Kansas, we have to be very careful…” (AR-01). 
 
“So we here in Western Colorado, we don’t want to be in position of causing compact administration 
on the [Colorado] river, which would further target the demise of agriculture and would also cause 
chaos under water administration” (CO-01). 
Lack of Information or 
Data 
AR, RG, SP, SW, 
YWG 
“Well, if you don’t have information about what your nonconsumptive needs are, how much water you 
need to have in the river… If you don’t know how much water you need, how can you say where you 
have a gap?” (SW-02). 
Underrepresentation of 
Certain Stakeholder 
Groups 
AR, CO, GN, MT, 
NP, SW, SP, YWG 
“I think the recreation and environmental stuff is an important need, but it’s probably 
underrepresented… in other words, you have these two representatives from every jurisdiction and 
then you have the ten sort of ‘at-large’ reps, and there’s one for the environment and one for 
recreation” (AR-02). 
Low Participation (by 
Members or Important 
Stakeholder Groups) 
CO, GN, MT, NP, 
RG, SP, YWG 
“I mean, frustratingly, there are only a relatively small number in any community… there’s only a 
handful of folks that participate and do the work” (YWG-02). 
 
“I’m a true believer in the transparency but I’m also a true believer that people have to get involved, 
you know? And they’re pretty nonchalant about it … including you know, state senators and you 
know, elected officials, etc.” (SP-03). 
“Red Tape” or 
Permitting for Projects 
AR, SP, SW, YWG “Just enlarging two dams is going to take a lot of work just to get it approved and then you’re probably 
looking twenty years down the road till that can actually happen” (AR-01). 
 
“The particular point that I was making there is that actually accomplishing that will only occur when 
the parties involved are willing to change NEPA and the permitting process to where it is actually less 
burdensome” (YWG-02). 
Bureaucratic Issues, 
Political Climate or 
“Politics” 
CO, GN, MT, SP, 
SW, YWG 
“Denver Water is trying to push legislation to require only that the higher efficiency fixtures be sold. It 
seems to us like a no brainer tiny baby step in a much more difficult progression of things we’re going 
to have to do to meet the gap, and we can’t even do that, right? So why would we want to count on 
going down this path of huge amounts of progression on conservation without even taking the first 
steps” (MT-01). 
 
“So, you know, people are looking to field the gap on the Front Range and of course everybody in the 
Yampa and the Gunnison is worried that we all have a target on our backs” (GN-02). 
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permitting constraints for new projects or the potential for politically powerful entities to take 
control of the process, as major limitations to the outcomes that they would like to see produced.  
Interestingly, many of these limits would not exist in a top-down governance system where 
decisions are made and put into action by the one entity that, for the most part, has enough power 
to overstep things such as informational limitations.  This provides one example of how variables 
within the “Long-Term Coalition Opportunity Structure” box of the ACF, specifically those 
concerning consensus, can moderate between relatively stable system parameters and how 
groups interact within a policy subsystem. 
Another limit mentioned my many interviewees was related more directly to the 
Roundtable process as opposed to an external factor: the length of the process.  While it is 
obvious from the literature, as well as the reasons interviewees gave for “whole-Roundtable” 
cooperation outlined in Chapter 6, that long-term, face-to-face contact is important for promoting 
trust, understanding, and collaboration, such a lengthy process can potentially be taxing on 
participants, especially those that do not recognize or benefit from some of the more 
intermediate, informal outcomes of the Roundtable.  In addition, some participants feel as if the 
Roundtable process is trying to take on too many issues instead of focusing on “the problem,” as 
defined by most Eastern Slope basins, of filling the municipal supply gap on the Front Range.  A 
number of interviewees reflected on this issue of speed specifically: 
Something that I think is powerful about the Roundtable structure is the inclusion of 
all these different interests and kind of creating a network of…and enhancing the 
existing networks of people working on these issues from various angles, giving 
them a forum to come together and work is just, you know… I think over time 
creates good outcomes, but how do you enhance those and speed those up? Good 
questions. (RG-02) 
 
I can honestly say that we’ve always wanted to see more happen quicker… much to 
the frustration to a lot of folks... (SP-03) 
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I’ve been quite frustrated with the slowness of the groups in trying to resolve that 
issue and felt like, well, really maybe the Metro and the South Platte ought to just 
work together on what they can do. We’ve got the problem. So, in a sense we’re 
being dragged down by a lot of different interests around the state, I think 
detracting from the majority of the problems right here, right now. (MT-01) 
 
The length of the process may also drive some stakeholders away from the conversation 
completely, an issue with major procedural consequences that will be discussed in more depth 
under the following sub-question. 
 An additional factor that was only raised by a few interviewees directly, but was often 
alluded to more broadly, was the idea that even if governance of water resources was actually 
modified as a result of this collaborative process, the way water is used is affected by other sectors 
outside of the water users themselves.  One interviewee put it this way: 
If we’re really going to solve some of these issues, we really need to get some of 
the other local governments that are involved in land-use planning much more 
attuned to water and understanding the importance of how their decision-making 
process and things like the density of the development they do and the types of 
landscaping they allow in new commercial or pro-residence developments, how 
that all feeds into our ability to meet—or not—our future water needs. (MT-03) 
 
In other words, Roundtable members may feel that even if they are able to promulgate outcomes 
that work to meet their basin’s water needs, these strategies will ultimately prove ineffective 
unless all of the appropriate entities are involved in and committed to the solutions. 
A final, and crucial, constraint that many interviewees addressed quite separately from 
the other limits mentioned in Table 7 is the power that the Roundtables have to fundamentally 
create outcomes, especially considering the multi-level governance structure in which the 
process is embedded.  Interestingly, some interviewees saw the Roundtables as having a large 
amount of power in a number of different venues, while others saw the Roundtables as 
essentially powerless due to their lack of formal legislative power.  Text concerning these issues 
was coded for both power (POWER), which consisted of “yes” and “no” sub-codes, and multi-
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level governance (MULTILVL), which contained categories for specific CWCB-IBCC-
Roundtable issues, as well mentions of more broad-based local-state-federal concerns.  
Importantly, a number of interviewees saw the Roundtables as having an important and 
powerful role in the process of governing Colorado’s water resources, despite the fact that they 
legally do not have any decision-making power.  One interview conceptualized this by likening 
the Roundtables to a Chamber of Commerce, a governing body who “has no power in itself but it 
has a voice because its members come from various constituencies” (CO-01).  In other words, even 
though the Roundtables have no formal power, they do preserve the ability to exert important 
influence—or “moral authority” (AR-02)—on planning and decision-making processes within 
the water supply community. 
A number of other interviewees mentioned that the Roundtables’ power and influence 
stems directly from their authority to decide which entities to grant funding to within the basin: 
[T]he Roundtables themselves have money and authority—to a pretty good 
degree—to spend their own basin funds. (RG-02) 
 
I do think the Roundtables have a lot of power because they have complete 
decision-making [authority]… They really have a lot of control as to how they 
spend their money… In some ways I think they do have a lot of power and, and 
never before have we had this big bucket of money in our basin for water projects, 
so that’s a pretty big deal I think. (SW-01) 
 
However, many other participants saw the Roundtables as fairly powerless, leaning on 
the fact that they have no legislative authority to actually build projects or pass laws: 
What more [the Roundtable process] will accomplish is questionable I think 
because the Roundtable has no legal authority to do anything except present nice 
plans, so that’s been the disconnect from the very outset. It was one of the 
objections to the bill in the very first place. You know, this is just an exercise in 
futility because even if you come up with the best plan, you still can’t implement 
it—you have no authority. (GN-01) 
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Some interviewees put this more grimly, citing concerns that the outcomes produced by the 
Roundtables may exert very little influence on future water planning in Colorado due to the 
Roundtables’ inherent “powerlessness”: 
Colorado likes to do things from the bottom up, and here you have a governor 
trying to do something from the top down, so it’s already an idea with a lot of 
opposition, which is why, that being said, I’m really curious to see what the outline 
of the draft of that [state] water plan is going to look like…who’s going to be the 
leaders, what’s going to happen, and how do we get to that point of the 
implementation? The fact that the turn-arounds [for basin input] are so quick leads 
me to believe that the plan itself will be rather shallow. (SP-03) 
 
As alluded to in the above quote, recognizing where Roundtables stand in relation to the other 
governing entities involved in the process is also critical for determining what limits are placed 
on the Roundtables. 
Concerning these power relationships, some Roundtable members outright questioned 
where they stood in relation to the IBCC, the organization that was created alongside the 
Roundtables to facilitate statewide discussions of water policy and management, and initially to 
help the Roundtables negotiate voluntary water-sharing agreements between basins.6  A number 
of stakeholders explained that they feel the IBCC has “struggled for its identity” (AR-02) 
throughout the process: “To use a military context, do they out rank us? Are they the super-board? 
Nobody really knows.” (AR-02)  This sentiment was echoed by other interviewees who seemed 
unsure of what the true role and authoritative status of the IBCC actually is compared with the 
Roundtables and even the CWCB: 
When you separate decision-making authority… and the CWCB has authority and 
funds and they have to make decisions and do stuff, and IBCC isn’t as clear, so that 
makes it challenging in a new way. (RG-02) 
 
                                                 
6 None of these agreements have been officially created to date. 
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Others spoke more broadly about related concerns with the “top-down influence” on what was 
supposedly developed as a grassroots process centered on basin-scale analysis and decision-
making: 
I think there’s a little bit of the problem there in that the Roundtables get pushed, 
distracted, whatever you want to call it, because a state, a state who provides the 
grant funds and all that, is kind of driving the agenda a little bit. And, I think we’d 
probably be doing something a little bit different [if the state was less involved], 
but I can’t tell you exactly what that would be. (CO-03) 
 
Therefore, while perceptions of being powerless might serve as a limit to some 
Roundtables as they attempt to produce outcomes, it may simultaneously empower other 
Roundtables (those who see their ability to grant funds and influence conversations as important) 
to devise innovative solutions to Colorado’s water issues.  Investigating the relationship between 
Roundtable members’ perceptions of power and the outcomes their Roundtable produces could be 
an additional area for fruitful further study. 
 
RO2.3: What role does consensus play in producing outcomes in a collaborative process? 
 
In order to understand not only what outcomes look like in a collaborative process, but 
also how Roundtables actually produce said outcomes under the norm of consensus, interviewees 
were asked if the Roundtable that they participate in usually comes to consensus, as well as what 
issues were the easiest or most difficult to reach consensus on.  The responses that interviewees 
provided were coded for processes described to reach consensus (CONSEN) and well as for the 
various definitions of consensus provided (CONDEF), again each with a number of sub-codes.  
Table 8 displays Roundtable participants’ varying definitions of what consensus means in their 
own Roundtables. 
Interestingly, there was much overlap between these categories, and thus they should not 
be considered hard-and-fast, especially because all Roundtables “vote” on proposed projects to  
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Table 8.  Definitions of Consensus as Identified by Roundtable Participants 
Definition Roundtables that Mentioned 
Definition 
Relevant Quotations 
Unanimous Agreement 
• requires all members to vote in 
favor 
SW “And we have had those moments when someone 
said, ‘I will not provide consensus on this,’ and so it 
has gone back for further discussion or something 
like that. So we’ve seen that work” (SW-01). 
Majority Agreement 
• specific mention of a “majority 
rules” case in which the side with 
the most votes “wins” 
CO, NP, SP “So, we do operate under consensus and that 
consensus can look like a 19 to 3 vote, or you know, 
a 17 to 5 vote depending on who’s there” (CO-01). 
General Agreement 
• no specific mention of numbers or 
“majority rules;” instead, the 
focus is on a feeling of general 
agreement or at least the absence 
of stakeholders who clearly 
disagree 
AR, GN, MT, RG, YWG “The way we work, we’re consensus oriented, and 
our definition of consensus is, you know, ‘if you can 
hold your nose and not, even if you don’t like it, if 
you can hold your nose and okay, then the project 
passes’” (AR-01). 
 
“So, consensus for us… it’s a nice word, but we try 
to get to general agreement, understanding that you 
can not—it’s not perfect” (RG-01). 
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some degree.  In fact, even though some Roundtable members made it very clear that their 
Roundtable does not define consensus as being unanimous7, members from all Roundtables 
mentioned that decisions were made by unanimous vote more often than not.  Additionally, 
while the majority of Roundtable members expressed that their Roundtables have deep 
discussions and negotiations that, once complete, typically satisfy the majority of members, a 
number of interviewees also cited different reasons for why their Roundtables come to consensus 
that are important to discuss here. 
All of the interviewees from the Southwest Basin emphasized that because their basin is 
actually composed of nine fairly separate “sub-basins,” decisions on most projects that came up 
for a vote relied heavily on the representative of the basin to which that project applied to 
influence the rest of the group’s vote: 
It seems like many of our decisions are… “shall we do this?” Somebody says 
“yes,” and everybody says “okay,” and that’s consensus. And it’s probably because 
we have the nine separate basins, and so somebody from X isn’t in tune to the needs 
in Y, and if Y says they need it, I’ll go with it (SW-03). 
 
I think it’s different in our Roundtable because we are nine sub-basins and it makes 
it very difficult…I live in the X sub-basin, and it’s so far removed from the Y sub-
basin and from the Z area, and so it’s very hard for me to tell them “this isn’t a good 
project”… we kind of rely on the representative from each of the nine [sub]basins 
[for a recommendation] and there’s very little questioning of that. (SW-01) 
 
Interestingly, the Southwest Basin was also the only basin that defined consensus as having all 
members agree8.  Somewhat similarly, members in the Gunnison Basin occasionally come to 
consensus in a more passive manner that leans on the advice of “experts” on the Roundtable: 
                                                 
7 When asked about consensus, one participant replied, “No, we vote… I don’t agree with the term ‘consensus.’  I 
think in this country, we vote… We don’t operate by consensus.  We have general agreement, but we vote” (NP-01). 
 
8 One member of the Southwest Roundtable expressed concern that the Roundtable never clearly defined what 
“consensus” meant, but also said that it never became an issue because everyone always agreed: “I guess I was in 
favor originally of a vote rather than consensus cause no body could … okay, we got twenty-nine or thirty members 
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Amongst thirty people, there are definitely probably five or six really respected 
leaders who do most of the talking and people kind of trust their opinions. (GN-02) 
 
Additionally, members in the South Platte and Metro basins may reach consensus due to 
yet another issue alluded to previously: that many of the most controversial players have been 
“worn out” by such a lengthy process, leaving only those who generally agree—or are at least very 
willing to compromise—to do most of the negotiating: 
I think the process to this point may have worn some of the participants out. So the 
people who are still at the table are going to probably agree anyway, you know. 
Like the people at the table are people that we have worked with in the past, we 
know we can work with; some of those people that we can’t or haven’t—I wouldn’t 
say we can’t, but they just aren’t showing up anyone—just aren’t there to really 
promote maybe some of those contentious issues that we should be debating. So I 
think that’s a process issue more than anything else. (SP-01) 
 
I think our Roundtable and how it’s proceeding generally, to borrow a phase, is a 
little bit of a “coalition of the willing”… it’s ultimately been a long enough, slow 
enough, painful enough kind of process for folks who have frustrations… [so 
willing members are] self-selected to participate. (MT-03) 
 
In other worlds, basins may experience “consensus by attrition” as groups that are more 
controversial or generally receive less support at the Roundtable fail to participate over 
time, leaving only those members who generally agree to make decisions. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, because most collaborative governance processes including 
the Roundtable process rely primarily on “consensus-based” decision-making models (Kenney, 
2000), the achievement of “consensus” by a group is often be equated with successful 
collaboration.  Ideally, consensus-driven models foster the development of organizational 
attributes such as improved trust and social capital among stakeholders, which many assume to 
have a “cause-and-effect relationship” with “on-the-ground success” (p. 39-40).  However, as 
seen above, Roundtable members define consensus—and the appropriate processes through 
                                                                                                                                                             
and so what if you have a consensus except for two people, is that a consensus? And I don’t know if we’ve ever 
defined that. Luckily I guess we have never really had to face it” (SW-03). 
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which to reach that consensus—in a variety of ways.  Moreover, expressing that the group 
generally agrees appears to be important for each Roundtable.  These overarching claims about 
consensus may be due in part to a belief held by the interviewees that consensus is appropriate, 
acceptable, and even what should result from a collaborative process.  In other words, 
“[c]onsensus, we are told, is not merely a logical and inevitable product of the search for truth, 
but is something with a strong social value” (Kenney, 2000, p. 41). 
This begs the question of whether some stakeholders may “consent” to projects or ideas 
in a collaborative process for reasons other than legitimately agreeing with the project or idea.  
For example, one stakeholder, whose basin identification is removed in order to further protect 
anonymity, explained the following: 
I’m often in a position where I would be the only dissenting vote, and in order to 
maintain some commonality, I’ve been in a position to vote for things that, should it 
be in a different political environment, I wouldn’t vote for. 
 
In this case, the stakeholder may be attempting to use some form of reciprocity in order to foster 
whole-group collaboration, which Ostrom (1998) identifies as “a core norm used by many 
individuals in social dilemma situations” (p. 4).  For these reasons, along with the fact that 
“consensus” is organically defined in many different ways, researchers must be particularly 
careful when equating a group that reaches consensus with a successful group. 
 
RO2.4: Do outcomes reflect recommendations that reinforce the status quo 
or recommendations that vary greatly from the status quo? 
 
As mentioned in the Chapter 6, the “loose” coalition structure seen in this collaborative 
process, which may also reflect the norm of consensus detailed above, could potentially lead to 
“lowest common denominator” solutions (Leach & Pelkey, 2001, p. 382).  In other words, 
because participants know that the collaborative process requires them to reach a high degree of 
         98
consensus to produce policy outcomes, and because reaching consensus is socially valuable, 
groups may produce outcomes that reflect only the most basic points upon which they can agree 
instead of working to make major changes to relevant policy.  To better understand this 
phenomenon, interviewees were asked whether they thought the outcomes that their Roundtable 
produced stuck closer to the status quo or varied greatly from the status quo.  Their responses 
were coded under a spectrum of outcome types (OUTTYPE), including status quo, mixed, or 
innovative, and are listed in Table 9. 
Some participants had particular difficulty answering this question because they did not 
recognize any “formal” outcomes that they could then classify as status quo or innovative.  
Others argued that the issue was not so black-and-white: 
I probably think some of the most novel ideas are status quo. And most other 
people would be shocked by some of them, but for me they’re just the way I see the 
world.  So… the idea of status quo has very little relevance to me. (YWG-03) 
 
This statement was reinforced by the fact that some basins deemed certain strategies such as 
conservation as “innovative,” while others felt that conservation was an important but fairly status 
quo strategy, as shown in Table 9. 
Although most interviewees expressed the desire to develop innovative solutions, others 
saw maintaining some version of the “status quo” as necessary in certain cases.  For example, a 
number of interviewees that reasserted the need for innovation also agued that traditional water 
projects that have already been approved but have been held up for some reason need to be 
brought to fruition, especially because “there’s…. very little objection to those projects that were 
already on the books to be completed” (AR-01).  Others felt that because their basin’s main goal is 
to protect existing water uses, they must go about doing so in a fairly status quo manner as they 
have in the past.  Related to this, because many interviewees recognized that many of the water  
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Table 9.  Types of Innovative and Status Quo Outcomes Identified by Interviewees 
Basin Innovative Strategies/Projects/Attitudes Status Quo Strategies/Projects/Attitudes 
Arkansas  Groundwater and alluvial aquifer studies; re-
assessing the value of agriculture; new supply work 
Traditional projects that have already been deemed 
acceptable need to be brought to fruition 
Colorado  Increased conservation; land use/water supply 
planning connections; sharing of agricultural water 
People do not want to “rock the boat;” while people 
recognize they need a change, no one wants to be 
the person who changes 
Gunnison Risk management approaches Fundamental water issues haven’t changed in 100 
years; nonconsumptive interests still have to be 
“tempered” depending on who they’re talking to; 
desire to protect existing uses 
Metro Land use/water supply planning connections; 
alternative transfer methods for agricultural water; 
integrated supply projects, “no regrets” planning 
Because the water supply is not likely to increase, 
people can’t become too innovative; some 
innovative solutions like agricultural water transfers 
are not permanent and are thus difficult for 
municipal providers to rely on; conservation. 
North Platte Wetland studies; potential connections between 
increased storage and environmental uses  
Projects aren’t truly multi-purpose and some may 
not even be helping the state’s overall water 
situation; the basin is limited because of legal 
structure that sends their excess water to Wyoming; 
headgate restoration projects 
Rio Grande People are generally more open to diverse solutions 
and projects; new ways to manage aquifer 
depletion; hydrologic studies that link things like 
fire and energy development to water; conservation 
easements 
Protecting water from exportation by outside 
developers or municipalities continues to be an 
issue and remains so today 
South Platte More “multi-use” projects that provide benefits to 
all (e.g. restoring wetlands) 
Dealing with water issues that have existed for 
decades with solutions that are still not agreed upon; 
projects are small and not tackling the major issues; 
fear of losing their water permanently (or losing 
money) in agriculture-to-municipal water transfers 
Southwest Various “out of the box” projects that make non-
traditional connections with water (e.g. local food 
projects); conservation easements 
Some restoration of diversion structures and other 
traditional water development projects; sometimes 
real change can only happen through costly legal 
processes 
Yampa-White-Green Wide range of projects funded, from consumptive to 
nonconsumptive and agriculture to energy 
Continued lack of recognition of the importance of 
nonconsumptive attributes in the basin; political 
barriers limit innovation (e.g. legislation has not 
passed for efficient toilets); conservation 
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issues that they are dealing with today have been the same for decades, they felt that there was not 
much room to be innovative: 
This is an evolving process, but the fundamental issue has not changed in 100 years 
or more. I mean we’re a lot more sophisticated now… but fundamentally the issue’s 
been the same all over and that likely won’t change. (GN-01) 
 
Still others mentioned that while everyone seems to like the idea of doing innovative projects, no 
one is quite ready to be the innovator himself, and thus the issue is more political than anything: 
It’s one of the things that’s frustrating to a degree that, when this whole process 
started 8 years ago… one of the big things was “the status quo doesn’t work 
anymore!” But everybody’s reaction was, “yes, we need to make changes, but don’t 
touch my status quo!” (CO-02) 
 
Finally, one interviewee even made the direct connection between the limits imposed by consensus 
norms and the possibility of creating status quo solutions, adding that innovative solutions often 
require costly legal processes to implement: 
You know by consensus, things have to be win-win or at least nobody complains 
too much. So there isn’t a drastic change, but to me the alternative to that if you’re 
going to drastically change something, you go to court and you litigate and boy, 
that’s costly. (SW-03) 
 
 Chapter 6 demonstrated that some interviewees argued that their Roundtables did not 
truly feel a need to prioritize their goals before the impetus of the BIPs and CWP.  Here, 
interviewees from both sides of the divide similarly cite that before these processes began to 
“push” the Roundtables forward, there was little incentive to tackle larger, more controversial 
issues, such as the development of new supply, and more prerogative to continue discussing 
issues that were perhaps simpler, easier to debate, or more “status quo”: 
[T]here really was just no pressure to really do something…there are a few of our 
members, including those that are representatives on the IBCC, who just said “we 
go to the IBCC, we talked about this stuff,” but nobody says, “hey, let’s talk about 
trans-basin diversions.” (SP-01) 
 
         101
So, the big question, the elephant in the room really, is moving a lot of water to the 
Front Range possibly. We have not talked about that. There’s been, you know… I 
guess the IBCC has been talking about, but we haven’t had someone directly come 
to us and say, “hey, would you be willing to give up a ton of water?” (YWG-01) 
 
 In conclusion, the outcomes and potential policy recommendations created through this 
process present a mix of innovative and status quo strategies; while a collaborative process may 
allow for fresh ideas to come to the table, or for existing ideas to be seen in new ways, it is also 
possible that participants will aim to achieve consensus over smaller and more predictable “status 
quo” outcomes instead of working through innovative, but often controversial solutions. 
 
Discussion 
Taken together, the answers to these questions better elucidate how outcomes are produced 
in a collaborative process (RO2).  Yet, this information simultaneously broadens the initial scope 
of the question by defining a number of important, yet non-traditional and informal outcomes of 
collaborative processes, such as increasing the diversity of participants in water discussions.  It also 
emphasizes the importance of providing the resources necessary for successful outcomes, such as 
funding, which can incentivize active participation in the process over time.  In addition, 
collaborative processes face unique limitations to the types of outcomes they can produce—and 
often, the speed with which they can produce them—that may not be present in traditional, top-
down management processes.  Finally, consensus arose as an important driver in producing 
outcomes but also served as somewhat of a constraint on outcomes by potentially steering 
collaborative groups towards outcomes that they can easily agree upon and away from 
controversial matters with innovative solutions.  A number of important themes arise here; a few 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Two related limits to successful outcomes that were widely mentioned by Roundtable 
members are underrepresentation of certain groups—specifically the nonconsumptive sector—and 
low participation by a number of other groups, despite the process being open and public.  As 
shown in Table 7, some Roundtable members saw elected officials and state senators as 
“nonchalant” about becoming involved in the Roundtable process (SP-03).  Another interviewee 
mentioned that although the membership of the Roundtables is defined in the enacting legislation, 
Anyone who wants to come and talk and offer ideas is welcome.  Always.  It’s a 
public meeting and we get a few of those—mostly the people who want 
money…or a person who’s running for office who wants to be able to claim 
credibility, knowing about water issues or attending the Roundtable meetings or 
something like that. (GN-01) 
 
A third interviewee also mentioned the potential for unspecified groups to complain that they 
were wrongfully excluded from the process: 
What I’m waiting for is…to see whether you get a new group of stakeholders that 
come to the table who will claim that they’ve been disenfranchised in this 
process… there are a lot of folks who probably need to be involved with the 
Roundtable process who I don’t think have really paid very much attention. (YWG-
03) 
 
Interestingly, as the due dates for the Basin Implementation Plans and a draft of Colorado’s 
Water Plan neared (but after the above interviews were conducted), a group of Colorado senators 
lead by Democrat Gail Schwartz begun to claim the Colorado Legislature was indeed left out of 
the CWP planning process; consequently, the group attempted to pass SB 14-155, which “requires 
the Colorado legislature to approve a statewide water plan now under development by the 
Colorado Water Conservation Board and nine regional water groups” (Gardner-Smith, 2014), 
essentially undermining the “bottom up” Roundtable process.  James Eklund, head of the CWCB, 
and Mike King, head of Colorado’s Department of Natural Resources, both defended the 
Roundtables’ work (Bartels, 2014), and by mid-February the senators sponsoring the bill had 
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backed down, requesting only “public hearings and reports to the Legislature” rather than 
legislative approval of the plan (Hanel, 2014). 
This echoes the comments of Bidwell and Ryan (2006) and Leach (2006) cited in Chapter 
2 in the discussion of diversity and representation in collaborative processes.  These authors 
argue that a collaborative process must include all necessary stakeholders in order to be 
successful, which often requires going beyond “voluntary” or “inclusive” participation to active 
recruitment of all potentially interested parties.  Although Roundtable participants acknowledged 
time and time again that the process was open and public, the participation of certain groups such 
as legislators was not actively sought, and thus they ended up feeling marginalized.  
Consequently, in order for a collaborative process to promulgate successful outcomes, it must be 
willing to go beyond simply “open” or “inclusive” participation to ensure, or at least attempt to 
ensure, the inclusion of all interested parties.  However, acknowledging all interested parties and 
then providing incentives for them to participate can obviously be prohibitively difficult.  
Investigating how existing collaborative processes have accomplished this successfully is an 
important area for further research. 
Many interviewees also highlighted institutional limits to producing successful outcomes, 
including what role the Roundtables played in the larger governance process and how they were 
able to exercise power in this role.  Some stakeholders see the Roundtables’ role as that of 
providing basin-scale information to the IBCC, who will then work with the CWCB to create 
legislation; other stakeholders expressed uncertainty about exactly what the IBCC’s role is and 
how the “bottom-up” Roundtable process can mesh with that of a more “top-down” decision-
making body.  In their institutional analysis of collaborative processes, Ananda and Proctor 
(2013) argue that the “success of collaborative approaches largely depends on the institutional 
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configurations that support them” and that, specifically, “institutional reforms in water 
governance must focus on the type of power and authority and tasks assigned to each level of the 
nested decision hierarchy” (p. 105).  In other words, better defining the role that each entity plays 
in a multi-level governance structure that contains at least one collaborative level can help to 
avoid future conflict between entities at differing levels.  This, of course, depends upon whether 
“operational level” institutions have the appropriate capacity to handle new responsibilities, 
which the Ananda and Proctor (2013) argue “must already be in place in a given community” in 
order for collaborative processes to succeed (p. 105).  Moreover, as mentioned in the literature 
review by various scholars, building relationships—not only among stakeholders in collaborative 
processes but among participants at varying levels of the multi-level process—often requires 
developing trust through long-term interactions, which in itself can serve as a limit to whether 
stakeholders who represent controversial viewpoints continue to participate in the process over 
time. 
Finally, while consensus was recognized as an important driver in the Roundtable process 
that helped to foster policy-oriented learning and rapport building among stakeholders, it was 
also seen as a limiting factor to the types of outcomes that may arise from a collaborative policy 
process.  As theorized in Chapter 4, processes that require a high level of consensus to move the 
policy process forward can potentially result in loose coalitions.  While these coalitions may be 
able to capitalize on overlapping beliefs by using common strategies such as multi-purpose 
projects and reduce costs by sharing resources, they also may feel pressure to achieve consensus 
because of its social value rather than creating divergence over truly complex, controversial, and 
potentially crucial issues.  Thus, relying completely on consensus-based decision-making may 
lead collaborative groups to avoid bigger issues in favor of the less important items that they can 
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agree on (Leach & Pelkey, 2001), or worse, suppress potential disagreement with the dominant 
view because those holding minority opinions are not empowered to share their opinions 
(Kenney, 2000). 
In conclusion, while a variety of important formal and informal outcomes are produced in 
consensus-based collaborative processes, scholars must be careful to recognize potential 
constraints on the outcomes of these processes when evaluating their success.  Practicing active 
recruitment of potentially interested parties, clearly defining roles of the entities at all levels of 
the process, and finding ways to encourage civil disagreement under consensus-norms are just a 
few of the conditions that can improve the potential for collaborative policy processes to produce 
successful outcomes.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
Well, you’re talking to Colorado. 
Water’s our history, it’s our current event, and it’s our future.  It’s our economy. 
And a lot of people get that and they appreciate it, you know. (CO-01) 
 
 
This study sought to broadly investigate the conditions under which collaborative 
governance processes can produce successful policy outcomes by investigating a case of 
collaborative governance currently on-going in the State of Colorado: the IBCC/Roundtable 
process.  Despite the fact that the topic of this process—water—is highly controversial and 
salient, as illustrated by the quote above, the process itself was designed to be conducive to 
collaboration among a diversity of stakeholders, making it a useful case to examine here.  
Specifically, two research objectives, each with a number of sub-questions, were investigated 
with respect to this process in order to provide insight into the broad theme mentioned above in 
an organized manner.  The most important findings concerning these two objectives will be 
recounted here, particularly regarding how these findings relate to the theoretical developments 
proposed in Chapter 4 and the overarching research question of this study.  The chapter will then 
conclude with a discussion of study limitations, as well as a number of hypotheses generated 
from this exploratory study that can be systematically tested in further research on the 
Roundtable process and similar collaborative governance processes. 
 
RO1: To understand if and how stakeholder values are 
effectively reconciled in a collaborative process. 
 
 This objective was tackled by investigating coalition formation among stakeholders, as 
well as belief prioritization and alteration after participating in a collaborative process.  Coalition 
formation of varying degrees was observed across Roundtables.  Somewhat formal coalitions 
were observed among non-consumptive stakeholders, while more informal coalitions formed 
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between agriculture and one of the following groups: recreational stakeholders, environmental 
stakeholders, or local governments (Table 4).  These informal coalitions were fairly loose and 
resulted mainly from groups recognizing their mutual gain or risk from a certain coordinated 
action (or lack of coordinated action) and potentially working together on a single project for a 
short period of time.  More often, interviewees described collaborative activity—specifically the 
creation of projects that had multiple benefits or uses—that occurred among most or all 
participants within a Roundtable.  Interviewees elaborated on the reasons behind this “whole-
Roundtable” collaboration, which include learning, shared values, initial suspicion of one 
another, funding constraints, and external threats (Table 5).  Finally, while interviewees had a 
particularly difficult time defining their exact beliefs, much less prioritizing them, it is important 
to acknowledge that up until this point in the process, any type of formal prioritization has not 
been required of most Roundtable members. 
 The fairly loose coalition structure observed in the study is consistent with predictions 
made in Chapter 4 about how subsystem structure may vary within a collaborative as opposed to 
an adversarial policy process (Figure 3).  Roundtables members are faced with overlapping and 
often constrained resources, and many members use the strategy of supporting multi-benefit 
projects to make those resources go further.  Importantly, some interest groups also have 
overlapping beliefs (e.g., high quality water supplies being of importance to both agriculturalists 
and environmentalists), which may encourage them to coalesce on certain policy objectives, or at 
least support one another’s attainment of policy goals that underlie common objectives.  This 
coordinated behavior, characterized simply by “some degree of working together to achieve 
similar policy objectives” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 196) is indicative of weak coalition 
formation.  While Sabatier & Weible suggest that weak coalition formation may be a particularly 
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important tactic in situations where “organizational membership faces legal impediments that 
limit formalized alliances” (p. 197), which holds true to some extent with the Roundtables, weak 
coalition formation also appears to be an important path for diverse stakeholders working 
together in a situation that requires a high degree of consensus to produce outcomes.  
 
RO2: To understand how outcomes are produced in collaborative policy processes. 
 
 This objective was broken down by first examining what outcomes actually look like in a 
collaborative process, and then investigating what factors limit these outcomes, how consensus 
shapes their production, and whether they reflect status quo or innovative ideas.  As stated in the 
discussion section of Chapter 7, examining the wide variety of outcomes produced by the 
Roundtables inherently broadened the scope of this research objective to include an investigation 
of both formal and informal outcomes.  Some of the most frequently described outcomes of the 
Roundtable process include producing policy tools or documents, funding projects, learning or 
increased teamwork among stakeholder groups, increased diversity in and/or new forums for 
water conversations, increased rapport among participants, and public education (Table 6). 
 Perhaps just as important as these outcomes are the reasons why the production of other 
types of outcomes is limited.  Commonly stated constraints on outcome production include a 
number of biophysical, social, and political conditions such as inherently limited water supplies, 
restrictive laws or compacts, lack of appropriate information, underrepresentation of certain 
groups and low participation by others, permitting issues to actualize projects, and issues related 
to bureaucracy and political climate (Table 7).  Importantly, limits directly related to the process, 
such as the length of time required to bring outcomes to fruition, are also salient for participants.  
Of specific importance are institutional concerns that may limit the production of successful 
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outcomes, including determining what role the Roundtables play in the larger governance 
process and their ability to exercise power in this role. 
 Consensus appeared as both an important driver and limit of outcomes.  The vast 
majority of interviewees expressed that the Roundtable in which they participate typically comes 
to consensus on issues; however, consensus was defined in three main ways: as unanimous, 
majority rules, or simply general agreement on issues (Table 8).  Working under the consensus 
norm seemed to encourage stakeholders to cooperate, learn from one another, and devise 
solutions that generally satisfied the membership of the Roundtable.  However, because 
stakeholders know that consensus is necessary to produce outcomes, they may refrain from 
suggesting more innovative, yet controversial ideas, leading to a proliferation of solutions that 
cater more to the status quo than to new ideas that truly tackle Colorado’s biggest water issues 
(Table 9).  Even worse, Roundtable members may consent to things that they fundamentally 
disagreed with because it is socially valuable to create consensus in the Roundtable.  These 
results further provoke the ideas presented in Chapter 4, namely that processes that are highly 
depending on reaching consensus may result in the formation of looser coalitions; perhaps the 
idea that processes highly dependent on consensus may also produce fewer innovative solutions, 
especially in the face of a large number of constraints, could be added to the potential theoretical 
developments proposed by this study. 
 
Under what conditions do collaborative governance processes 
produce successful policy outcomes? 
 
Although this study focused specifically on coalition formation and outcome production 
in one collaborative process in Colorado, the results speak broadly to the overarching research 
question of this study, recounted above.  In Chapter 2, Table 1 described a number of factors 
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perceived as important for success in collaborative governance processes that were drawn from 
the existing literature on this topic.  Below, a revised version of Table 1 (here, Table 10) is 
presented with the first three factors from the original table—funding/resources, leadership, and 
trust—removed in order to allow for a focus on the remainder of the variables that arose as 
particularly important for success in Colorado’s Roundtable process: commitment, 
goals/institutional design, and diverse composition and participation of stakeholders.  Each of 
these factors is presented with a description from the original version of Table 1 along with a 
brief summary of the role that this factor played in the success of the Roundtable process.  
Understanding the specific importance of these factors in the Roundtable process can provide 
insight into why they may also be key drivers of success in other collaborative processes. 
Importantly, the focus on the three key factors in the table is not to say that the other 
variables that were removed from the original table lack importance in this process or in 
collaborative processes in general.  However, they simply were not highlighted as crucial 
motivators success in this particular process for a variety of reasons.  For example, issues of 
funding, particularly through Water Supply Reserve Account Grant program, were major 
incentive for stakeholder participation; however, restricted funding seemed to actually foster 
more collaboration among stakeholders in certain basins because they saw an additional gain 
from working together through the creation of multi-use projects compared to that which they 
could have done on their own.  Moreover, some participants recognized leadership within a 
Roundtable as a very important factor in the Roundtable’s ability to produce successful 
outcomes, but other basins did not mention the role of any specific leaders or their influence on 
the process.  Additionally, leadership at the inter-basin level was described with mixed feelings 
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Table 10. Factors Perceived as Important for Success in Colorado’s Roundtable Process 
Factor          Description of Factor Role in Colorado’s Roundtable process 
Commitment • Participants must be committed to the collaborative 
process rather than to their own individual interests 
• Commitment can be built through a sense of shared 
ownership in the process and a recognition of 
interdependence 
• Stakeholders who generally received less support may 
have failed to commit to the Roundtable process 
• Because of the process’s length, stakeholders may have 
become “worn out” over time and thus became less 
committed 
• Thus, committed parties more directly influenced 
outcomes 
Goals/Institutional 
Design 
• Successful partnerships focus on a number of 
attainable, clearly defined goals 
• Achieving goals creates an incentive to participate, 
especially when this achievement is dependent on 
many members 
• Understanding how the process is nested within 
current institutional structures is essential for realizing 
goals 
• Many Roundtable members saw the ability to achieve their 
own “goals,” mostly through the funding of projects, as a 
sign of a successful process 
• However, most Roundtable participants explained that a 
lack of clear rules governing their role and authority within 
the larger process served as a limit to producing successful 
outcomes 
Diverse Composition 
and Participation 
• Through the process of dealing with their own internal 
differences, diverse groups create collective goals that 
serve a broader number of interests 
• Diverse participation requires active recruiting of 
relevant interests—it does not happen naturally or by 
having membership simply be “open” to anyone 
• Roundtable members from all stakeholder groups 
recognized that in most basins, some stakeholders were 
clearly underrepresented 
• This served as a limit to producing truly collaborative 
outcomes that satisfied all participants 
• Roundtable members recognized that although the process 
is public, some groups may need more direct 
encouragement to participate 
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and even confusion by many interviewees.  Third, gauging the importance of trust in creating a 
successful Roundtable was particularly difficult, especially because many Roundtable 
participants had not participated since the initiation of the process and had drastically different 
degrees of interpersonal relationships and trust with their fellow Roundtable members.  Overall, 
participants lauded the development of a common understanding and language among 
stakeholders as a more important factor in Roundtable success rather than trust.  Thus, a deeper 
investigation into the key variables in the table is crucial, but other important potential drivers of 
success must be kept in mind in order to better address the nuances of specific collaborative 
processes. 
Study Limitations 
 
While the results from this study can be useful in describing how stakeholders interact, 
reconcile their values, and product outcomes in a collaborative process, it is important to 
recognize that the data analyzed here are inherently based on participants’ perceptions of the 
process instead of on a quantifiable variable that could be measured to capture some of these 
ideas, such as “number of projects funded by the Roundtable,” or “number of joint policy 
statements produced by stakeholders.”  While a measure such as this would have allowed for the 
creation of an index of collaboration by which each Roundtable could have been ranked, or a 
data set that could have been analyzed statistically for correlations among variables, it also 
would have missed much of the depth and nuance captured in this study through conversations 
with individual Roundtable participants that explored the processes underlying many of these 
important outcomes.   
Related to this limitation is the important fact that not all participants in the Roundtable 
process were interviewed in this study, as there are over 300 people who participate in the 
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process fairly regularly.  Despite trying to interview a variety of stakeholders from different 
geographical regions and interests groups, one stakeholder’s view is of course not representative 
of the entire group or region that he or she represents (though interview questions were designed 
to ask the interviewee more broadly about his or her stakeholder group’s goals and beliefs, for 
example, rather than those that he or she held personally).  Thus, it would be helpful to produce a 
survey instrument that could quantitatively test some of the most relevant findings from this 
study on a larger and more representative sample of Roundtable participants.  Additionally, other 
people who were not directly involved in the Roundtable process but who work on issues that 
may overlap with the Roundtables’ work, such as land use planners, legislators, and even vocal 
opponents of the process, could also be surveyed to gain additional perspectives on the process’s 
success and importance in overall statewide water planning.  It would also be interesting to 
survey participants in other collaborative processes within the state of Colorado in order to better 
understand if ideas about coalition formation and outcome production in a collaborative 
watershed governance process are transferrable to other collaborative processes within a similar 
geographic and political context.  Similarly, it would be interesting to see if these findings are 
confirmed by participants in collaborative watershed governance processes in other states with 
different geographical and political contexts. 
 Finally, it is important to recognize the potential biases that come along with using 
interview methods.  Aside from the obvious issues of the interviewer potentially influencing the 
interviewee’s responses through leading questions or even simply by being present, interviewees 
in this case may have spoken more positively about their participation in the Roundtable process 
than they would have in an anonymous survey because they were being interviewed on exactly 
that topic.  They may have emphasized, and perhaps exaggerated, the importance of their role in 
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the process or the significance of the process to Colorado’s broader water management regime 
simply because they assumed the interviewer was interested in these factors due to the selected 
research topic.  However, many interviewees were quick to recognize the faults of the 
Roundtable process, so this issue may have been more limited than one might expect.  Using a 
survey instrument to complement the interviews conducted for this research would help to 
reduce these potential sources of bias in the future. 
 
Hypotheses for Future Testing 
 
 In order to address some of the above limitations and expand this study in other fruitful 
directions in order to more thoroughly address the major research question, a number of testable 
hypotheses generated from this research are posed below.  These hypotheses are written with the 
specific case of the Roundtables in mind but could easily be adapted for testing in similar 
collaborative governance processes.  Beneath each hypothesis is a brief explanation of the 
drivers underlying the generation of the hypothesis, as well as any existing evidence to support 
or disprove the hypothesis.  In addition, Figure 4 from Chapter 4 is reproduced below for 
reference, as it provides another way to visualize how the suggested hypotheses interact with one 
another within the system. 
H1: If a low degree of collaboration is required between Roundtables in the process of making 
statewide decisions during the formation of Colorado’s Water Plan, then a more traditional 
policy subsystem structure will develop during this stage of the policy process. 
 
Directly related to the ideas proposed in Chapter 4 about subsystem structure, nested 
governance processes, and inter-Roundtable collaboration, this hypothesis alludes to a potential 
future situation in which decisions about statewide water planning are not made based on the 
norms of collaboration or consensus developed among stakeholders who participated in the 
Roundtable process.  If these norms are not adopted, a more traditional subsystem structure with 
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adversarial coalitions may arise (as depicted in the Level 2 circle of in Figure 4) compared to a 
more collaborative subsystem structure (as depicted in Level 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1a. If policy subsystem structures vary greatly among levels of governance, decision-
making processes will involve more conflict and will create outcomes that are less 
satisfying to a wider variety of stakeholders.  
 
H1b. If policy subsystem structures are fairly similar among levels of governance, 
decision-making processes will create outcomes that satisfy a wider variety of 
stakeholders. 
 
 Related to H1, H1a and H1b predict that stakeholders’ satisfaction with the outcomes of a 
decision-making process may be related, in part, to the way various subsystems are structured 
and relate to one another within a larger governance process.  In other words, the correspondence 
Figure 4 (reproduced): An example of how the Roundtable process could potentially be nested 
within a more traditional, top-down policy process that requires a low degree of consensus and 
consequently produces a different subsystem structure, despite sharing context and some 
participants. 
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(or lack thereof) in institutional structures and norms between Level 1 and Level 2 in Figure 4 
can influence the success of the broader collaborative process once it is embedded in a larger 
institutional structure.  For example, in a situation where different norms are adopted at Levels 1 
and 2 (as depicted in Figure 4), it is likely that Roundtable participants, who developed much of 
the data and analysis for Colorado’s Water Plan and other potentially influential water 
management documents through a collaborative process, could be dissatisfied with the 
cooptation of this information by policymakers that use it to implement “top-down” governance 
regimes at the state level.  The fear of this situation was alluded to by a number of interviewees 
who expressed hesitation with the existing “top-down” influence of the state on the supposedly 
“bottom-up” Roundtable process (see RO2.2).  Conversely, stakeholders will likely be more 
satisfied with a process that adopts similar norms at all levels (i.e. adopting those norms 
associated with collaboration at Level 2 to make higher-level management decisions).  
H2: If Roundtables have more external connections to available resources, then they will be less 
likely to fund truly multi-purpose projects that require a high degree of collaboration. 
 
Many scholars echo the idea that adequate funding and resources are necessary for 
success in a collaborative process (see Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007).  Based on this premise, it may be logical to assume that the more participants in a 
collaborative process who have connections to external groups from which they can obtain 
resources, the more smoothly collaboration will function because the pressure of disbursing 
limited resources is essentially reduced.  However, initial findings from this study suggest that 
when actors are required to share a specific amount of resources among themselves, they may 
devise more creative ways to work together and make the resource go further, essentially 
improving true collaboration among stakeholders.  For example, in Table 5, which concerns 
limits to producing outcomes, a number of stakeholders mention that some groups were so 
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constrained by resources that they would not have achieved their goals if they had not worked 
collaboratively with other stakeholder groups.  Further investigating the dynamic interaction 
between resource availability and successful collaboration is thus an important area for further 
study. 
H3: Collaborative subsystems that are initiated with collaborative norms, rather than those that 
arise from “hurting stalemate” situations in adversarial processes, may be particularly prone to 
very loose coalition structures and the “traps” of creating outcomes that appear more “status 
quo.”  
 
This hypothesis is posed for investigation in a situation in which the Roundtable process 
could be compared to another similar collaborative governance process that arose from a 
previously adversarial subsystem (e.g. those typically discussed within the context of the ACF).  
While adversarial groups may begin to collaborate after a “hurting stalemate,” it is possible that 
they will maintain more formal coalition structures because they have experienced and acted 
within these structures for a number of years, or perhaps even decades.  Moreover, because 
actors in a previously adversarial subsystem began to collaborate as a result of a specific “hurting 
stalemate” in which no other viable options were perceived, they make be likely to produce 
outcomes that vary more drastically from the status quo than groups such as the Roundtables 
who have not faced one particular “hurting stalemate” during their tenure. 
 
Summary 
Investigating these hypotheses, in conjunction with a number of other areas important for 
further study mentioned throughout this paper, can help to further define the vast and nuanced 
conditions under which collaborative governance processes can produce successful policy 
outcomes.  This study examined one collaborative governance process in the state of Colorado in 
order to provide insight into two areas of this broad theme: if and how stakeholders form 
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coalitions within collaborative governance processes (RO1), and how outcomes are produced in 
collaborative governance processes (RO2).  It also helped to provide an initial understanding of 
the factors that allow collaborative governance processes to produce successful outcomes, such 
as commitment from stakeholders, clear goals and institutional design, and diversity of 
participants.  By using a number of important ACF variables to guide this study, the results also 
provide an analysis of where collaborative policy subsystems and the negotiated agreements they 
produce fit into the ACF at large, a framework that had been traditionally employed in the 
analysis of more adversarial subsystems. 
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Appendix A.  Coding Structure 
Coding Group  Corresponding 
Objective 
Super Codes Corresponding Sub-
Codes 
1.  Coalition 
Formation 
1 COALIT 
 
RESOURCES 
STRATEGY 
CNTENTION 
NC, AGREC, 
AGENV, MUNI, 
OTHER CO 
2.  Goals and Beliefs 1 BELIEF 
 
GOAL 
 
INTGRTN 
 
VBGCHNG 
SELF, OTHER, 
WHOLE 
AGGOAL, 
NCGOAL, 
MUNIGOAL 
EASY, PARTL, 
DIFFCLT 
3.  Consensus 2 CONSEN 
 
CONDEF 
DISCUSS, EXPERT, 
VOTE, PASS 
UNAN, MAJOR, 
GENAGG, ILLDEF 
4.  Outcomes 2 OUTCOME WSRAG, POLICY, 
LEARN, TEAMWK 
5.  Outcome Limits 2 OUTLIMIT WATER, POLITICS, 
RIGHTS, INFO, 
UEREP, REDTAPE, 
LOWPARTIC 
6.  Outcome Types 2 OUTTYPE STATQUO, 
INNOVTV, MIXED 
7.  Power with a 
Multilevel 
Governance Process 
2 POWER 
MULTILVL 
POWYES, POWNO 
LSF, IBCC 
8.  Other 1 & 2 PROGRAMSACTIVITIES 
CLMCHNG 
PROCESS 
QUOTES 
 
 
COMMITT, 
REASON 
 
